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Abstract
Modern scientific psychology continues to advance toward newer and greater discoveries of the
inner workings of the human mind, posited in the belief that a universal objectivity exists if only
to be found. Despite the professional emphasis on conducting psychological enterprises in this
manner, the field has spent much of its formalized existence struggling to answer some of its
most basic questions. This paper thoroughly explores the nature of a scientific psychology, while
suggesting that psychology may find wisdom in its philosophical origins. It further suggests that
psychology continue toward a postmodern epistemology, in which a unitary psychological reality
is abandoned for the realties that exist within the minds of unique individuals. Social
constructionism provides the foundation for the postmodern theory throughout the paper. To
highlight the character of this discussion, the concept of diagnosis is carefully examined, with the
diagnosis of depression serving as the chief example. In the context of this conversation, research
was conducted that attempts to explore the contemporary epistemological and diagnostic beliefs
of both beginning and advanced clinicians. This research included the use of an online survey
that asked current clinical and counseling psychologists about their views regarding the diagnosis
of depression, and the practice of diagnosis more generally. Current doctoral students in clinical
and counseling psychology programs were also surveyed, to observe chronological changes in
perspective.
Keywords: diagnosis, depression, social constructionism

This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and
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Philosophical Ends to Scientific Means: Diagnosis and the Epistemology of Psychology
The field of psychology has undergone much reiteration in what constitutes valid and
appropriate research and practice. While its origins have been heavily influenced by classic
philosophical thought (Gurwitsch, 2009), a more modern era has ushered in an age of prevailing
“medical naturalism” that seeks to place suffering and illness within a reductionistic biological
domain (Giorgi, 2014; LaFrance & Stoppard, 2006; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Ussher, 2010). This
line of thinking is invested in the notion that an objective reality exists, which can be observed
and known through careful scientific deliberation and study. Observation serves as a tool for
collecting data, while simultaneously determining what is from what is not (Gergen, 2015).
This paper examines many of the historical roots of psychotherapeutic practice, in order
to develop an understanding of how diagnosis has become an essential part of it. It looked
specifically at the diagnosis of depression, and attempts to form a coherent narrative of how this
illness has been conceptualized and classified over the last several centuries. Later in this paper,
new survey research is discussed which examined modern beliefs about diagnosis and
depression, as endorsed by clinical and counseling psychologists and clinical and counseling
doctoral students.
Depression Statistics and Study Overview
As the modernist scientific ontology has pervaded the clinical landscape, the adjoining
epistemological determinants guiding treatment have shaped our understanding of diagnosis. The
most formal exemplar of this is found within the pages of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The most recent
edition of this manual, the DSM-5, was released in 2013 and began reshaping diagnosis across
the United States once again (APA, 2013). While adding some brief considerations regarding the
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role of culture in understanding mental illness, the DSM-5 continues to admonish the importance
of a medical naturalist stance, prioritizing the objectivity of the disorders listed (APA, 2013).
Another highly influential text that impacts the global understanding of mental illness is
the World Health Organization’s, International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related
Health Problems (ICD). This classification system has undergone 10 major revisions, with the
eleventh due in the next few years. The ICD includes classification for mental disorders and
describes the tens of thousands of physiological illnesses that medical professionals encounter as
a part of their practice (WHO, 1992). This pairing makes it clear that it is believed mental illness
has similar biological origins as the many other illnesses listed within the ICD’s pages.
Social and cultural factors are recognized as having some impact on the etiology of
mental illness, but these recognitions seem to imply that these factors play a background role in
comparison to their biological underpinnings. While used in conjunction with the DSM-5 in the
United States, the ICD has been the primary and/or sole manual for diagnosis in much of the rest
of the world (WHO, 1992). The medical naturalist epistemology reflected in the ICD further
highlights the predominance of the modernist perspective in society today. In many cases, the
diagnostic classifications of mental illness listed within the ICD-10 are nearly indistinguishable
from those in the DSM-5. In recognition of time and the purposes of this paper, both systems of
classification will be viewed as conceptually the same.
One of the disorders of primary concern within the DSM-5 is Major Depressive Disorder.
It is currently viewed as a major health issue worldwide by the World Health Organization
(WHO, 2002, 2017). It is the most prevalent psychiatric disorder, and is the leading cause of
disability among women across the globe (WHO, 2000). Of the millions who suffer with a Major
Depressive Disorder, approximately 15% – 40% may end up making a nonfatal suicide attempt
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(Holma et al., 2010). Sadly, nearly 15% of those with a Major Depressive Disorder will end up
completing suicide (Gradus et al., 2010; Maris, Berman, & Silverman, 2000; Sainsbury, 1986).
Major Depressive Disorder also places a heavy burden on the United States’ economy, costing
approximately $210.5 billion dollars annually in medical expenses (Greenberg, Fournier,
Sisitsky, Pike, & Kessler, 2015). Overall, the depressive disorders are thought to impact
approximately 322 million people around the world (WHO, 2017).
Despite these concerns, there remains a significant amount of debate about whether
Major Depressive Disorder is most usefully understood as described by the DSM (Black, White,
& Hannum, 2007; Cromby, 2004; LaFrance & Stoppard, 2006; Mulder, 2008; Parker, 2005;
Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Ussher, 2010). Much of this controversy surrounds the treatment
methods that a medical naturalist position recommends for the treatment of depression. When
viewed predominantly as a disease with biological origins, a biological solution is implied. This
biological solution often takes the form of antidepressant medication and recent research has
found that approximately 11% of people in the United States 12 and older are currently taking
some form of antidepressant medication (Pratt, Brody, & Gu, 2011).
While modern psychotherapeutic practice can broadly be understood as coming from a
predominantly positivist/naturalist paradigm, there are specific models that attempt to paint a
clearer understanding of how disorders like depression develop. The foremost of these models is
called the “Diathesis-Stress Model” (Chang, Yu, Chang, & Hirsch, 2016; Rioux,
Castellanos-Ryan, Parent, & Seguin, 2016; Santor, 2003). This theory suggests that the
development of illnesses such as anxiety and depression are largely dependent on the
individual’s level of vulnerability (diathesis) and the amount of stress they are experiencing. The
vulnerability component of the theory pays significant attention to genetic factors, and the
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likelihood that some members of society will be naturally more susceptible to the effects of
increased stress. When a person with high vulnerability encounters life events that are
particularly stressful, it is believed that an illness such as depression may develop as the person
becomes overwhelmed and unable to cope (Santor, 2003).
The diathesis-stress model was heavily influenced by the work of Richard Lazarus (1966)
who hypothesized that a person’s experience of stress is largely dependent on how they
conceptualized it in their mind. A person’s view of the stress they are experiencing may vary
based on their appraisal of the situation, and whether they believe their stress to be manageable
or overwhelming (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, 2001; Lazarus, Deese, & Osler, 1952). Factors such
as hope and trauma (Chang et al., 2003), temperament (Rioux et al., 2016), dependency (Santor,
2003), and motivation (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, 2001), and how they affect the likelihood of an
individual developing mental illness have also been examined through this lens.
While the diathesis-stress model of mental illness attempts to consider contextual factors
that lead to suffering, it is typically seated within the broader modernist epistemology described
above. Various articles seek to address the naturalist dilemma of measuring and objectively
observing the mediating factors that play a role in the diathesis-stress relationship (Chang et al.,
2003; Lazarus, 1952; Rioux et al., 2016; Santor, 2003). While this is likely a noble task, other
theoretical models may call into question the likelihood of applying the level of desired
objectivity to such complicated social concepts.
In contrast to a modernist and/or medical naturalist perspective, alternative views of
mental health, diagnosis, and suffering exist. One perspective is found within the theory of social
constructionism. Social constructionism is a postmodern perspective within the field of
psychology that rejects many of the previously held modernist views. It challenges the notion
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that individual knowledge exists, and that the external world is observable by individuals seeking
to discern truth. Instead, it proposes that knowledge is shared between individuals in relationship
with one another (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen, Lightfoot, & Sydow, 2004).
From this perspective, the mainstream system of diagnostic classification observed in the
DSM-5 would be viewed as a dominant cultural narrative of suffering and illness. While
containing some utility and value, it would not be seen as an objective reality explaining the
experiences of people in a universal way. Instead, social constructionism suggests that each
individual holds their own unique subjective reality, which defines how they experience
suffering and pain (Gergen, 2009). The narratives produced by these unique perspectives would
be given priority in psychological treatment, as there would be no alternative view believed to be
more valid. In this way, social constructionism suggests a very egalitarian approach toward
understanding the distress experienced by others (Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 2009).
Since understanding the suffering of others is a primary concern of those practicing
within the field of mental health, it is important that the epistemologies utilized for shaping these
understandings are continuously placed under thoughtful scrutiny. This paper offers an in-depth
examination of the literature describing some of the historical changes in ideology toward
understanding human suffering. In particular, it explores a variety of perspectives and their
consequent understandings of diagnosis. Diagnoses of depression are explored throughout this
paper as a catalyst for facilitating this discussion.
As a part of this scholarly discussion, research was conducted that examined the beliefs
of current mental health practitioners. These mental health provider participants included
seasoned professionals in the field, and those who are relatively new to the field or still
completing their graduate training. Insights into the complexities of topics like diagnosis and
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depression were gained through examining the beliefs of those in the mental health field. This
research contributed to our understanding of how diagnosis and depression show up in clinical
practice in a practical way. The results of this research also highlighted possible changes in the
field between those who underwent their graduate training in decades past, and those who are
currently making their way through this process. Discrepancies between clinicians’ views about
diagnosis and their actual use of diagnosis in clinical practice were also of interest. These
research findings assisted in the formulation of a more comprehensive understanding of how
theoretical epistemologies impact clinical treatment, and the role of diagnosis as a part of this
process.
Literature Review
Brief History of Psychology
Before delving into the complex history of psychological classification and the diagnosis
of depression, it seems fitting to provide a brief history of the field of psychology in general. As
implicitly and explicitly reinforced throughout this paper, context has a profound impact on the
development of thoughts and ideas, and thoughts and ideas shape the way we conceive of
problems and generate their solutions. This makes it an essential task to understand cultural
context so that our awareness of streams of thought and their action-based implications can be
thoroughly understood.
Searching for an official beginning to the field of psychology can be an arduous task
because the origin of psychology is like a large tree, supported by a myriad of deep roots that
support its growth and stability. Like a large tree, many of these roots often go unnoticed, buried
by years of historically layered sediment and the by-products of change over time. Given the
present contexts and purposes of this paper, I was not able to exhaustively explore each of these
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roots, nor dig deep into the specific roles these roots have played in making psychology what it is
today. A discussion of this magnitude would likely take a lifetime. Despite this, an awareness of
some of these origins was valuable in assessing the ground from which diagnosis sprung, while
examining the intellectual conditions that made the past ripe for a modernist epistemology of
mental health.
Many searching for the birth of the field of psychology look to the year 1879, when the
early psychological experimenter Wilhelm Wundt first set up his laboratory in Leipzig Germany
(Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004). Wundt came from a philosophical background, and at one
point was the chair of a philosophy department. In his work, however, he began to develop a
more modernist notion, that though the mind is an abstract concept, its principles and functions
could be understood by utilizing experimental deliberation (Laungani, 2004).
While Wundt’s discourse in scientific thought certainly gained detractors, it also fit well
with a broader culture of academic progression that was looking to create a new discipline.
Adherents to this new way of conceptualizing the mind felt that psychology could become a
distinct study from philosophy. By making this distinction, difficult abstractions became less
burdensome or were otherwise scrutinized through proper experimentation. Many researchers at
the time were also motivated by the possibility of making psychology a science akin to other
natural sciences, where ground-breaking discoveries could be made, and revolutionary ideas
could have an impact on the world (Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004).
Utilizing the year 1879 as the marker for the origin of the field fits relatively well in a
modernist narrative of psychology as a science, where careful observation is thought to beget
truth and knowledge. It also fits well in a narrative that seeks to distinguish or separate the field
of psychology from philosophy. However, this inauguration does not fit well in a broader
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cultural narrative, where the importance of philosophical thought is viewed as critically vital for
understanding how psychological inquiry became possible. We can assert that 1879 may be
viewed as a meaningful and important birthdate for the scientific psychology that has continued
to dominate much of the academic and professional landscape, even to the present day (Hatfield,
2002; Laungani, 2004). Alternatively considered, it is likely that there exists no birthday for what
we now consider psychology, but rather that “psychology” is a term that was collectively and
culturally chosen to describe a broad swath of philosophical thoughts and ideas that were
connected to the existential question of what it means to be human and have human experiences.
In exploring the origins of these important questions, we must look to antiquity, and the
early writings of philosophers who sought answers to difficult human questions. Before this
exploration, it is important to observe the role of “Historical Myopia.” Historical Myopia is the
idea that when events and ideas are closer to us historically, we tend to have a greater sense of
their meaningful details and the knowledge they pass along. This can lead to a tendency to
perceive comparatively recent events or ideas as more frequent, intense, or important because the
information we have about them is more robust (Pinker, 2011). This valuable perspective
informs us that though we look to ancient philosophers of historical acclaim for our academic or
professional ancestry, it is likely that many relevant and related questions were considered by
humans who existed in the many millennia before them. Their relevant stories or writings no
longer exist, and therefore we are unable to hear from them or consider their contributions. This
may serve as an egalitarian reminder about what it means to be human and understand human
suffering. It is something that is shared by each person, not only those who make it their
profession or choose to study it for a lifetime.
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Aristotle, Plato, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, Rene Descartes, Immanuel
Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger and others should be recognized as some of the most
influential philosophers who have had an impact on present day psychology. For the purposes of
this study, I did not go deeply into the histories of each classic thinker, but a few are covered,
with concise summaries of their major works. Aristotle spent a great deal of time considering the
“mind-body problem” and the role of the “soul” in human experience. He further spoke of the
importance of reason, and how this quality separates humans from animals (Watson, 1963).
St. Augustine, a theologian and early member of the Christian church, had a dramatic
impact on the development of western philosophy, and thus the field of psychology centuries
later. St. Augustine spoke at length about the relationship between the body, the soul, and the
spirit. He also formulated early ideas about the roles of sensation and perception as parts of
personal experience. One of St. Augustine’s major contributions also includes the importance of
personal reflectivity, and an observation of the inner self as a means of developing knowledge
and wisdom (Hölscher, 2013).
Influenced heavily by Aristotle and St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas was another
theologian who began thinking about a variety of concepts central to modern-day psychology. Of
these, Aquinas continued a historical discussion on the body, mind, and soul, while also
considering the role of knowledge as reality-shaping. Aquinas furthered our understandings of
reason, rationality, and truth (Butera, 2010; Pasnau, 2002). Recent research has taken a close
look at the similarities between Aaron Beck’s Cognitive Therapy and the writings of Thomas
Aquinas. This work suggests Aquinas had developed and considered many of the key principles
central to a more modern understanding of cognitions and their impact on emotions (Butera,
2010).
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As can be seen from the last two historical contributors, the field of psychology would
likely not be what it is today without influences from the field of theology. Many of the concepts
described above were often seated within a Christian or theological frame, but advanced the
thinking of secular philosophers and psychologists for many centuries to follow. On this same
note, it is oft overlooked that the term “psychology” is derived from the word “psyche,” which
meant “spirit” or “soul” in traditional Greek (Haubrich, 2003). Taken together with the suffix
“ology,” psychology would therefore be the “study of the soul.” In similar derivations, the word
“psychiatry,” which would mean “healing of the soul,” or “psychologist,” to connote an
“attendant to the soul” (Haubrich, 2003).
Continuing with historical influences, John Locke’s efforts should be briefly highlighted.
With ideas clearly influenced by Aristotle and Plato, John Locke popularized the concept of
“tabula rasa” or “blank slate.” This suggested that when we are born, our minds are void of
pre-determined material, but are quickly inscribed with sensory experiences and their related
memories (Locke, 2009). Rene Descartes advanced thinking related to “mind-body dualism”
which proposed that our mind, or soul, is distinctly separate from the body, and can be
influenced by divine intervention (Descartes, 2009).
Søren Kierkegaard, often considered to be one of the first existentialist philosophers,
spoke directly about some of the problems of objectivity and truth. He strongly believed that
truth was something to be found within subjective experiences and personal knowledge. In
Kierkegaard’s work, this was often connected to the role of faith and one’s spiritual truth
(Kierkegaard, 2009). In other works, Kierkegaard spoke of the roles of choice, freedom, and
anxiety upon the human experience (Bretall, 1946).
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From Kierkegaard’s writings we can clearly see that debates surrounding objectivity and
subjectivity have existed for a very long time, reiterating the presence of “looping effects”
(Hacking, 2002; Smith, 2010). Looping effects are exemplified by those circumstances through
which bodies of knowledge are re-discovered by individuals, which can then lead to a
transformative experience for the person doing the discovering. It is not that the individual
created the knowledge anew, but that they have taken in something new to them. This new
experience can then be shaped by how this knowledge changes their views and interactions with
the world. This pattern explains how scientists or researchers are often quick to suggest a new
theory or idea has been discovered, when often their work likely existed in some form at some
point in the past (Hacking, 2002; Smith, 2010).
The following sections highlight major theorists that take the history of psychology
through the end of the 19th century and into the 20th. Since this paper aimed to maintain a
consistent appreciation of context, large scale cultural trends are covered briefly. Relevant
narratives from the individual local cultures of the theorists discussed are also included to round
out the perspective provided.
Freud, Witmer, and the origins of psychotherapeutic practice. Beginning a historical
dialogue with Freud may be considered arbitrary in many ways, however, it denotes a place in
time where a clear focus on the inner workings of the mind took hold of public imagination, and
therefore solidified its place in history. This point also represents a moment in history when
psychology as a research discipline began expanding its degree of practical application, and
began assisting others more psychotherapeutically.
Freud was born in Moravia in 1856 to a 40-year-old father and a 20-year-old mother. He
also had two half-brothers who were closer to his mother’s age than his father’s, which added
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some confusion to his early upbringing. During his birth, Freud was born in a caul, which carried
with it the cultural belief that the baby would become someone important or successful. On a
later occasion, Freud’s mother was told by an older woman that “she had brought a great man
into the world” (Demorest, 2005, p. 45). These cultural and somewhat superstitious beliefs likely
influenced the way his mother viewed him, and the expectations she may have had for his future.
Later in life, Freud recalled having seen his mother naked when he was an infant, and his
subsequent sexual urges at this sight. It is likely the salience of this event stuck with Freud and
played some role in the development of his theory of childhood sexual urges and the Oedipus
complex (Demorest, 2005). These theories were introduced at a time in history when the
mainstream society experienced a significant amount of sexual repression, and viewed his sexual
theories with both disgust and intrigue. If it were not for society’s specific reception of these
theories, it is possible Freud would not have become the influential figure he did (Benjamin,
2007).
Freud’s life was also transformed by the birth of his younger brother, Julius, who
interrupted the close relationship Freud had with his mother. Freud reflected on this time in his
later writings, and remembered harboring ill wishes toward his brother. These wishes were given
increased potency, from Freud’s perspective, when his brother passed away at 8 months old. The
young Freud began experiencing guilt at the belief that his wishes had in some way contributed
to his young brother’s death. In connecting these ideas to Freud’s theories, it seems plausible that
significant events like this had shaped his views regarding infantile aggression and the
importance of undesirable impulses in people’s psychological life (Demorest, 2005).
At a similar point in history, the field of psychotherapy was finding its footing through
the work of a little known founder to the field, Lightner Witmer. Witmer was born in
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Philadelphia in 1867. He was of Swiss ancestry, and grew up in a family of five. He was the
oldest of his parent’s three children. As Witmer was beginning his professional life in
psychology, he spent a significant amount of time studying the experimental method, and even
earned his doctorate studying under Wundt. At this point in time, Witmer was utilizing these
experimental methods to study things like reaction times, psychophysics, and individual
differences. It wasn’t long before he began to consider how psychology might be used more
practically for the lay population (McReynolds, 1987).
In 1896, Witmer was approached by a teacher who inquired about whether he thought
psychology might help one of her 14-year-old students who was having significant difficulty
learning how to write. Witmer accepted the challenge and took it upon himself to assist. This
became a notable moment in Witmer’s career, eventually leading him to establish one of the first
psychology clinics. Witmer later wrote papers on the practical uses of psychology, and
developed the term “clinical psychology,” which might not have come into widespread use
without his influence (McReynolds, 1987).
During the course of his immensely impactful career, Witmer went on to help found the
American Psychological Association, develop some of the first clinical psychology curricula,
and have a major impact on the clinical treatment of children and adolescents. He also started
one of the first journals on clinical psychology, “The Psychological Clinic.” At times, Witmer’s
views conflicted with other prominent thinkers of the era. He disagreed with William James’s
methods, believing them to be unscientific and numinous at times. He also eschewed many of
Freud’s psychoanalytic ideas, and would often employ methods more consistent with
behaviorism (McReynolds, 1987).

PHILOSOPHICAL ENDS

15

Despite his respect for the scientific method and its place in clinical psychology, he was
open-minded about clinical psychology’s place in the professional world (McReynolds, 1987).
He believed the new field he was helping to create was related to medicine, as well as closely
connected to other disciplines like sociology and more pedagogical studies (Witmer, 1907). He
also saw value in the use of psychological tests and measures, but felt that they alone were
incapable of providing a full picture of a person’s experience. He strongly valued the role of the
individual, eventually becoming skeptical of the use of statistics as a means of understanding
people’s experiences. During the later part of his career, he grew to appreciate the role of the
environment more and moved away from his earlier position which gave increased emphasis to
hereditary factors and their contributions to psychological functioning (McReynolds, 1987).
From these brief biographical accounts, the origins of psychotherapeutic practice can be
observed. Both of the men described above contributed in significantly different, but meaningful
ways. Freud developed a new dynamic model for understanding pathological behavior and
suffering, while Witmer stressed the notion that the experimental methods of the day could be
used outside of the academic realm to better the lives of the lay population. Both pioneers had
roots in the philosophical realm, with Witmer even becoming a member of the American
Philosophical Society (McReynolds, 1987). Without the influences of these men, it is likely that
clinical psychology, if it were still called that, would be significantly different than it is today.
Watson, Skinner, and the behaviorist focus on objectivity. During the first couple
decades of the 20th century, behaviorism began to have a more substantial impact on the field of
psychology. Behaviorism was largely advanced by the observations of the research psychologist
John Watson. This theory sought to change the focus from the complex inner workings of the
mind and onto a person’s observable behaviors. Watson preferred his new behaviorism over
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psychoanalysis because it prioritized a strictly objective perspective. He believed it left little
room for assumption or speculation regarding its explanations of behavior, and thought this was
the direction the field of psychology ought to go (Watson, 1913).
Watson cherished the relationship between psychology and the natural sciences. He felt
strongly that if it were going to survive as a respected discipline, psychology needed to adopt
more objective scientific practice. Watson was dissatisfied with the degree to which
psychoanalytic studies could be replicated, and felt that behaviorism offered an approach that
leant itself to scientific inquiry. It is worth noting that Watson experienced difficulty practicing
introspection and other psychoanalytic methods, and generally felt uncomfortable interacting
frequently with human research participants. It appears to be no small coincidence that Watson
directed his research toward animal subjects, and felt that the data collected from animals would
transfer proficiently to conceptualizations of human behavior (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010).
Watson’s ideas were well received by an early 20th century culture that was seeking
specialists who were viewed with more authority on the subject matter they studied.
Psychological testing was also being developed and finding its way into the knowledge of
mainstream society. This accompanied Watson’s motivation toward a psychology field utilizing
more objective data. While Watson already made a significant impact on the field of psychology
at an early age, it is likely he would have contributed even more had it not been for his
scandalous affair with one of his students, whom he later married. This relationship cost him his
academic position, and eventually led him to a career in advertising (Pickren & Rutherford,
2010).
Behaviorism’s rise to power didn’t decline with Watson’s retreat into the background of
the psychological research community. B.F. Skinner began to have an impact on the thoughts of
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academics and mainstream culture. He was greatly influenced by Watson’s work though this
may be due to the benefits behaviorism offered him on a more personal level. Skinner had just
experienced failure in college while trying to be a successful writer. In order to explain this
failure, he found that behaviorism provided a tolerable interpretation. Rather than having to
explain his difficulty through some fault in his own abilities, Skinner could assert that it was his
environment that was responsible for his failure as a writer (Demorest, 2005).
Skinner expanded upon the preexisting theories of classical conditioning by developing a
concept called “operant conditioning.” This theory suggested that not only are people
conditioned to act in a reflexive way by the environment, but that they also behave in certain
ways based on the consequences of these actions. When a behavior is positively reinforced with
a desired outcome, the behavior is more likely to be performed later. When an action ends in
some form of punishment, it is less likely to be performed in the future (Skinner, 1935). Skinner
(1971) was convinced by the strength of this idea and took a more extreme position on the matter
in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. In this writing, he encourages people to accept that
there is no such thing as free will or choice in life. Every decision, from the smallest to the most
important, is predetermined by the many systems at work in people’s lives. Culture often
manipulates some of the larger outcomes in human life and the events that take place throughout
them (Skinner, 1971).
Carl Rogers, empathy, and a rejection of environmental power. As the 20th Century
progressed, American culture was rapidly changing and began pushing for a perspective that
offered understanding rather than criticism. The powerful anti-war movements of the 1960s
created a motivated American sub-culture that wanted to be listened to rather than directed. Carl
Rogers was aware of these societal complaints and formulated the idea that people need the
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opportunity to be heard, empathized with, and regarded with great positivity no matter what they
might have to share. He felt that some of the pain people experience is brought on by a coercive
demand to meet cultural norms and values. Rogers concluded that mental health might be
achieved through opportunities to embrace one’s own individuality, creativity, and autonomy. He
felt strongly that individuals have all the wisdom they need to experience personal health, and
that therapy might be more effective if advice giving were removed from it (Pickren &
Rutherford, 2010).
Rogers grew up in a family that observed strict religious values, eventually leading to
fundamentalist practice. He later recalled having no doubts that his parents loved him but felt
certain they would be judgmental toward him if he behaved in ways that were considered taboo.
Rogers also reflected on the frequency of the teasing he received from his siblings, and he felt
that this had a corrosive effect on his relationships with them. This led Rogers to have a very
private inner life from an early age because he did not want to be judged by his parents or
chastised by his siblings. This caused a young Rogers to feel as though his deeply personal self
was only regarded positively when he fit within particular familial norms (Demorest, 2005). It
may be no surprise then that he later prioritized “unconditional positive regard” as one of the
qualities he saw as essential to effective psychotherapy. Based on a familial history that includes
these kinds of interactions, it is also not surprising that Rogers began to see a person’s
environment as something that can inhibit individuality, autonomy, and overall mental health
(Rogers, 1946).
Aaron Beck and the cognitive revolution. Cognitive psychology began to take shape as
a formal domain of interest in the late 1960s. Ulric Neisser proposed that the human mind works
similarly to a computer. As individuals live their lives and experience events, their minds are
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constantly taking in information, storing it, and retrieving it later on when useful (Neisser, 1967).
Richard Lazarus theorized that appraisal plays a significant role in people’s ability to tolerate
stress. He recognized that when people are able to develop optimistic appraisals of the difficult
situations they face, they are more likely to experience a lower level of stress and view the
situation as less threatening (Smith & Lazarus, 2001).
As cognitive psychology developed, it lent itself more readily to therapeutic use. As a
pioneer in this work, Aaron Beck formalized the modality of Cognitive Therapy and
hypothesized that as people grow and develop they create sets of “schemata” that are based on
their past experiences. These schemata are believed to be socially constructed and serve as rules
that govern how a person understands their life and the world around them. Beck observed that
people with mental illness tend to utilize maladaptive thinking styles in regard to what he called
the “Cognitive Triad.” The cognitive triad includes peoples’ core beliefs regarding themselves,
other people, and the outside world. Beck saw core beliefs as deep schematic structures that
influence the shallower levels of processing taking place in the form of people’s “underlying
assumptions” and “automatic thoughts” (Beck, Rush, & Shaw, 1979).
Beck suggested that the treatment of mental illness ought to involve assisting clients in a
process of “cognitive restructuring.” He found that if clients can begin engaging in more
reflective thought, they may be able to challenge some of the maladaptive or distorted thinking
that they are inclined to use. As this takes place it should ultimately lead to a reduction in their
level of pathological symptoms (Beck & Clark, 1997).
Since its roots in the 1960s, cognitive psychology has undergone a variety of changes in
how it has conceptualized mental health and the operations of the mind. Some recent theorists
have placed the roots of social constructionism, or constructivism more broadly, in the cognitive
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tradition (Mahoney, 1991). To locate social constructionist theory in the cognitive tradition, one
might observe the advancement from modernist to post-modernist thinking through their
ontological beliefs. Early cognitive theory might have been more modernist, as it sought to
measure processes of the mind like reaction times, memory (Miller, 1956), or symptom levels.
This data would then be utilized to form an objective understanding of how the mind works.
Cognitive psychology would have branched into post-modernism when it deviated from such
objectivity, instead valuing the constructive nature of reality, the narrative value of schemata and
the cultural differences inherent in creating meaning (Mahoney, 1991).
Now that the broader historical, cultural, and theoretical landscape has been described, a
narrower focus is necessary to explore the roots of diagnosis and depression. The following
narrative begins again in antiquity, this time exploring a different set of profound thinkers, and
their work as related to the topic being discussed.
History of Depression
We have distilled our modern-day understanding of “depression” from a uniquely
multifaceted historical context, with diagnostic classification ebbing and flowing over time.
“Melancholia” was one of the precursors to today’s depression. To understand the term in its
most literal sense, we must briefly examine the ancient theory of “humorism.” This perspective
was largely developed by the Greek physician Hippocrates, who is often considered to be the
father of medicine. According to humorism, the body consists of four primary humors which are
said to impact a person’s well-being: (a) yellow bile, (b) black bile, (c) phlegm, and (d) blood. Of
primary importance to this discussion is the black bile humor, or in the Greek “melaina chole”
(Bell, 2014; Berrios, 1988; Drabkin, 1955; Hippocrates & Schiefsky, 2005; Richet, 1910;
Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991).
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It is from the theory and tradition of humorism that the term melancholia predominantly
originates. A humoristic conceptualization of the illness would suggest that the suffering
individual had an excess of black bile resulting in the presenting painful disposition (Hippocrates
& Schiefsky, 2005; Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991). The philosophical nature of the illnesses’
proposed etiology is also noteworthy. The idea of physiological chemicals leading to
psychological distress draws some interesting parallels to our modern naturalist understanding of
mental illness. At the same time, the four humors were often said to be related to the four
planetary elements: (a) earth, (b) fire, (c) water and (d) air (Bell, 2014; Hippocrates & Shiefsky,
2005; Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991).
The cosmological view, including the four planetary elements, dates back to the Greek
philosopher Empedocles and the Pythagoreans. They determined that the number four could be
found in many areas of meaningful human life. They considered the four seasons, four qualities
of the four primary elements, and an overall conception of the “harmony of life” as being
connected to these numbers (Stelmack & Stalikas, 1991). This cosmological view supplemented
the humorist perspective by connecting the importance of the chemicals in one’s body to one’s
connection with nature, the earth, and the surrounding planets in our galaxy (Stelmack &
Stalikas, 1991).
In this sense, the humorist understanding of illness began to stray from the scientific
realist perspective and began to cling to a naturalist philosophical understanding. It is not hard to
observe the connections between this train of thought and the religious or cosmological beliefs of
Hippocrates’s time (Bell, 2014). Much of the Greek humorism developed in tandem with an
ancient culture that both sought an objective understanding of the world, while also seeking
answers from the celestial skies above. These parallels remind us that, just as in today’s modern
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society, medical and/or psychological practice develops in close relationship to the prevailing
culture and cannot help but be at least indirectly influenced by it.
Discussion of the history of melancholia would not be complete without some mention
of the premiere Roman physician Galen, and his study of the transformation of illnesses over
time. Galen’s impressive historical reputation is supported by his accreditation of having written
more medical texts than any other physician in antiquity. Galen was also an ardent follower of
Hippocratic medicinal practice, and he became so intricately connected to much of Hippocrates’s
work that professionals down through the ages have begun seeing both theorists’ work as part of
the same canon. While he considered himself to be a preeminent interpreter of much of
Hippocrates’s work, Galen also expanded upon the research and experimentation that had come
before him (Bell, 2014).
Galen advanced much of the early system of classification, which grew to include
illnesses like “phrenitis” and “lethargus,” which were thought to be primarily mental in nature
but included fever as a predominate symptom. This fever would be observed in combination with
significant “excitement” in the case of phrenitis, or depression in the case of lethargus. These
illnesses were believed to be separate from existing ideas of mania and melancholia which were
thought to exist more chronically, and without the presence of fevers (Drabkin, 1955.) Galen also
developed the notion that the four humors were connected to four psychological character types.
The black bile humor was representative of a melancholy type that was thought to be pervasive
and long-lasting in the lives of those suffering with it (Bell, 2014; Drabkin, 1955; Stelmack &
Stalikas, 1991). These kinds of classificatory subtleties seem to have led to a new understanding
of psychological experiences, while potentially adding some diagnostic confusion to the extant
understanding of individual suffering.
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These kinds of differential diagnostic puzzles can be seen as precursors to the rampant
diffusion that later impacted both melancholia and depression. With the subtle change to a
language of character types, the idea of melancholia invited comment and discussion from those
outside the field of medicine. In the years that followed, writers, politicians, ethicists and lay
people began speaking of being melancholy. This took the relatively professional and scholarly
concept of melancholia and transformed it into a broad cultural expression of feeling,
melancholy. As the term left its academic holdings, it lost not only the precision, but its previous
power (Bell, 2014).
Physicians of later centuries could no longer discuss melancholia without some influx of
lay societal understanding. Melancholia began to mean a variety of different things, even to the
physicians who continued to use it. Once the idea of being melancholy had pervaded the broad
vocabulary of western civilization, it left many of its theoretical underpinnings behind. This
disconnection from theory usurped the professional power from the everyday physician. As this
took place, the physician could not assert (to the same extent) his authority as a holder of
professional knowledge, because the world at large had adopted the term and made it its own.
Research and experimental theory provided an edifice of authority for those in medicine to stand
upon and this no longer existed when melancholia and/or melancholy became topics of everyday
discussion or “reality constructing” (Bell, 2014). This kind of linguistic power and
transformation is discussed again in later sections of this paper.
As the centuries passed, the term melancholia continued to take on new meanings. Prior
to the 19th century, it remained a comparatively broad term, and its detection was based
primarily upon its behavioral features, principally a decrease in behavioral output. It was also
thought to be a subtype of mania, including symptoms like agitation, hallucination, paranoia, and
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dementia (Berrios, 1988). In the earlier part of the 19th century, many physicians associated the
term melancholia with a sort of general “madness” (Prichard, 1835). While some relationship
between mania and melancholia was posited, the two were not believed to be polar opposites as
depression and mania may be viewed today. States of sadness or depression could sometimes be
found amongst the highly varied amalgam of symptoms contributing to melancholia, but they
were not typically seen as the essential features of the illness until the latter portion of the
century and the further development of diagnostic classification (Berrios, 1988).
One significant historical antecedent to modern depression and our current understanding
of the term melancholia can be found within the advent of another term called “lypemania.”
Although its use was predominantly limited to the countries of Spain and France, the clinical
understanding of lypemania began to move 19th century understandings of melancholia towards
what they are today. The expression lypemania was invented by Jean-Ètienne Dominique
Esquirol (1820), who suggested that lypemania was an illness presenting with delusions, but also
with “sadness which is often debilitating and overwhelming” (pp. 151-152). Esquirol further
went on to suggest that it was a form of suffering distinct from mania and dementia (Esquirol,
1820). This delineation seems to have begun pushing 19th century European physicians toward a
more precise belief about what constituted melancholia, and eventually depression. The term did
not last, however, as many practitioners in other parts of the industrialized world continued to
prefer melancholia over the newer lypemania. This seems to have been partially due to the
tendency at the time to frequently use both terms interchangeably. As this happened, the more
longstanding melancholia outlasted the comparatively young lypemania, which eventually fell by
the wayside of technical use (Berrios, 1988).
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As the beginning of the 20th century drew nearer, the term depression was utilized more
frequently, though a consistent understanding of what it meant remained unclear. In some cases,
the terms depression and melancholia were both used by the same physician, or otherwise used
interchangeably (Berrios, 1988). During the earlier portion of his career, Freud described a
“periodic depression,” which he believed to be a particular kind of “anxious neurosis.” This
illness could last for many months and involved a chronic period of anxiety attacks. He added
that this kind of ailment tended to have a distinct connection to a “psychical trauma” (Freud,
1893). As these kinds of descriptors suggest, Freud believed this kind of depression to fit more
closely with what might today be considered an anxiety disorder.
While highlighting this specific form of mental distress, he concurrently spoke of
melancholia or “melancholia proper.” According to Freud (1917), this illness contained
symptoms such as: feelings of worthlessness, loss of interest in things, difficulty sleeping, and
loss of appetite. He also noted that someone experiencing melancholia would have a significant
loss of self-respect (Freud, 1917). These kinds of symptoms closely resemble the diagnostic
criteria typically associated with depression, or more specifically, major depressive disorder
(APA, 2013). Freud’s use of both terms points to some of the ambiguity that existed in the late
19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. While he utilized a form of depression in his
diagnostic classification, it meant something different than how we understand it today.
Melancholia began to be understood as akin to modern day depression, but it was harbored in a
different linguistic frame.
Surprisingly, the term depression would not reach greater widespread clinical use until
the 1950s and 1960s. During this period of time, the first “antidepressants” were developed.
Some scholars suggest that the diagnosis of depression may have come from the idea that those
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who benefitted from antidepressants could subsequently be described as depressed.
Electroconvulsive therapy began to be used prior to the 1950s and 1960s, however, this
procedure did not specifically label patients as depressed (Hirshbein, 2006). The diagnosis of
depression was not listed in the first edition of the DSM (1952) and would not make its formal
classificatory debut until DSM- III (APA, 1980).
The term depression had been used in more minor descriptive ways in the first two
editions of the DSM, but it was not officially thought about as its own category of illness. In
DSM-I, experiences consistent with a depression or melancholia were placed under one of three
categories of psychotic disorders. In these cases, the disorder was believed to be primarily
affective in nature, separating it from the “Schizophrenic” or “Paranoid” types (APA, 1952,
p. 12). It was thought that sufferers would, at times, also have difficulties with reality testing,
sometimes experiencing hallucinations or delusions as a part of their illness.
More broadly speaking, it was believed that depressive-like symptoms arose as a defense
mechanism for managing an onset of anxiety (APA, 1952; Horwitz, Wakefield, &
Lorenzo-Luaces, 2017). Much of this initial DSM conceptualization can be understood when
taken in light of the prevailing theory and practice in the 1950s. Psychodynamic theory was
dominating the clinical landscape, and many mental illnesses were considered against a frame of
defense mechanisms and unconscious anxieties that were responsible for producing symptoms
(Horwitz et al., 2017).
DSM-II continued to view depression as an experience categorized under and in
connection to anxiety disorders. It spoke frequently of the role of “neuroses” and the belief that
anxiety was the central feature of these disorders (APA, 1968). During the 1970s, debate and
research intensified around the possibility that depressive disorders could exist as distinctly
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separate from anxiety or psychosis. In response to this increase in debate, and despite a relative
lack of evidence at the time, a new category was added. This change gave depressive disorders
their own category in the DSM-III (APA, 1980; Horwitz et al., 2017).
In the current era, antidepressant medications often dominate the psychiatric landscape
and represent a major biochemical intervention for the treatment of depression (Pratt et al.,
2011). Much of the emphasis on the use of antidepressant medications is advanced by the
medical model which suggests that there are distinct biological underpinnings for psychiatric
disorders. This perspective is largely founded upon finding physiological brain pathways that are
responsible for the depressive symptoms we observe (Callahan & Berrios, 2005). It also
attributes depressive symptomology to a lack of neurotransmitters and/or the idea that a chemical
imbalance is to blame for this kind of human suffering. The “Chemical Imbalance Theory” of
depression originated around the same time as the advent of antidepressant medication and has
remained a part of popular practice ever since (Callahan & Berrios, 2005).
Psychiatric practitioners continue to pursue findings consistent with this epistemology,
despite a continuing lack of agreement regarding a specific biological pathway in the brain
responsible for the symptoms of depression. Though there appears to be a lack of scientific
evidence supporting the Chemical Imbalance Theory of depression, antidepressant medications
continue to be widely proscribed. This may be partly due to the fact that, for many people, they
produce a desirable reduction of symptoms (Callahan & Berrios, 2005).
Key Concepts
Mental disorder. In order to understand what traditional diagnosis looks like in the
mental health field, it may be necessary to examine some of the core components needed for a
mental disorder to be present. According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), the
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DSM-5 states that, “A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental
functioning” (p. 20). As stated by this definition of a mental disorder, dysfunction exists within
an individual.
Despite the widespread use of the DSM as a clinical tool, and its laborious construction
and development by the American Psychiatric Association (2013), much controversy remains
regarding the mental disorders it describes (Demazeux & Singy, 2015; Ghaemi, 2014; Miller,
Wolf, & Keane, 2014; Wakefield, 2013). Some of this controversy is concerned with the
scientific underpinnings said to inform the DSM-5. The American Psychiatric Association
(2013) has suggested that each mental disorder should have objective criteria which determine its
presence within individuals. Statistical measures have been used to assign validity to the
disorders and emphasize the importance of being able to detect the same disorder among many
individuals who may be experiencing similar symptoms (APA, 2013).
As strong scientific validity is appended to mental disorders, the hope may be that they
become viewed similarly to various medical diagnoses (Ghaemi, 2014). This style of scientific
methodology stems from a post-positivist and/or modernist stance which claims that the world
and the observer of the world can be separate. The primary notion is that as scientific empiricists
engage with and observe the world, they can find objective truths that exist therein. Through
careful scientific deliberation, the world can be understood as it is, and the actions of the
observer will have little to no effect upon it (Creswell, 2007; Gergen, 2002; Gergen, 2009). The
post-positivist approach often acts in a reductionistic fashion, seeking to take broad theoretical
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concepts and break them into their narrower component parts as a means of better understanding
their functionality (Creswell, 2007).
As previously mentioned in this paper, mental disorders are often believed to exist within
individuals. This idea also has modernist roots and is maintained by the assumption that
individual knowledge is essential for understanding psychological processes. Each individual is
believed capable of rational, truth-bearing thought, which may be impeded by various kinds of
mental dysfunction. As a person experiences dysfunction, they become less able to maintain
objective truths about the world. The modernist view continues that language is used to
communicate the rationality and truth each individual holds which may be scrutinized against the
truths held by others’ individual knowledge (Gergen, 2001).
Social constructionism. Social constructionism is a postmodern perspective within the
field of psychology that rejects many of the previously held modernist views. It challenges the
notion that individual knowledge exists, and that the external world is observable by individuals
seeking to discern truth. Instead, it proposes that knowledge is shared between individuals in
relationship with one another (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen et al., 2004). Much social
construction takes place through a process called co-action, or coordinated action. As a person
shares their thoughts or feelings with another person, a reaction of some sort is called for, and
this reaction will continue to construct, for the other, how they understand the relationship. This
process extends far beyond the relationship, however, and these patterns shape how we conceive
of our world, and the subjective realities within (Gergen, 2009).
When two people are involved in a thoughtful discourse, they share meaning which is
thought to be derived largely from culture and tradition. As each individual develops and grows,
they learn the traditions of their local culture. During their lifetime, most individuals will meet
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many people from different local cultures who hold a different understanding of reality. Upon
this meeting, they may share their differing realities and through such processes, each
individual’s understanding of the world is shaped and reconstructed. In this sense, social
constructionism offers a very relational view toward understanding psychological phenomena
(Gergen, 2007; Gergen, 2009).
From the social constructionist vantage point, language is the primary vehicle through
which culture and knowledge are shared. As we grow and develop as individuals, we learn how
to use language in a way that is consistent with the cultural values of the society we are from. In
order to interact with others around us, who may also meet some of our most basic needs, we
must learn to socialize in a way that will be valued. A person may choose to reject the cultural
language values of the society they are from, but it is likely this will result in a decreased ability
to cooperatively communicate knowledge and understanding with those around them (Gergen,
2009). For example, if an individual decides to discard their family conventions around language
and begins describing the world in a way contrary to preferred understandings, communicative
collaboration with family members may become strained. This may be seen in deeply political
families, where one member chooses to adopt strong beliefs that run contrary to the political
values of the family majority. As these patterns continue, interaction may become less fulfilling
and the individual may find their family culture less nurturing and accepting (Gergen, 2009).
More broadly speaking, these communication difficulties can result in social justice
issues. As the modernist view of clinical diagnosis has become the dominant view in American
culture, other perspectives may be deemed unscientific, or inferior. This sets up the foundation
for a clinical system in which the providers of “truth,” the psychological scientists, determine
what is “reality,” while lay people are subjected to this view whether it resonates with their
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personal subjective reality or not. This process may lead to the marginalization of those said to
be lacking, or “abnormal,” within the dominant view (Gergen, Hoffman, & Anderson, 1996;
Gergen et al., 2004).
As the powerful voice of the media spreads the dominant cultural knowledge of mental
disorders, individuals may see themselves as possessing some form of deficiency. This
mechanism may create a cycle in which lay people see themselves as lacking, with clinical
providers being the only ones capable of repairing what is broken (Gergen et al., 1996). As this
takes place, the dominant voice within society gains a significant amount of public control, while
other societal voices are forced to relinquish the control they once had (Gergen et al., 2004).
Pragmatism is another major concept that supports the social constructionist perspective.
As ideas of objective truth and accuracy are rejected, the value in different perspectives is
derived not from the extent to which they represent one universal reality, but to the extent with
which they have utility within a shared subjective reality (Gergen, 1994; Gergen, 2009; James
1907). For example, in the United States we have laws which instruct legal driving practices.
Traffic lights direct us when to stop and when to proceed. Traffic lights do not reflect a universal
reality about how driving is to be done best, but function within a cultural system that gives them
purposeful utility. They serve to organize cars on the road, and as people share the socially
constructed reality that traffic lights are necessary, a sense of order can be experienced while
driving.
Diagnosis, as understood by the DSM, does meet some pragmatic ends. This can be seen
in the efficient manner by which providers are sometimes able to use commonly understood
diagnoses to conceptualize client cases for other professionals. Diagnoses can also be used for
effective communication with insurance companies, who look to reimburse providers for their
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services (APA, 2013; Ghaemi, 2014). The problem may not be that mainstream constructions of
diagnosis lack utility, but that they may end up providing their utility to those with the most
power within the mental health services field. If treatment is to be most beneficial for the clients
receiving it, it seems essential that their conceptions of the dysfunction they are experiencing be
given increased volume (Gergen et al., 2004).
Application to Clinical Psychology
If the field of psychology is going to adopt a new understanding of diagnosis, it will be
important for student clinicians be exposed to it. Theoretical models for clinical practice have
grown, developed, and fallen out of mainstream practice since the beginning of psychotherapy as
an established treatment. As this process takes place, student clinicians are trained and
scrutinized for their ability to replicate a desired treatment model. In today’s mental health
training programs, there may be a lack of emphasis on the role of context in mental health
treatment. Although many programs are discussing the role of context to some degree, this
discussion is often relegated to a single class where it may not be a primary focus (Peterson,
Vincent, & Fechter-Leggett, 2013).
As previously mentioned, personal knowledge and meaning are thought to be derived
from the relationships people have with each other (Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 2009; Gergen et al.,
2004). This means that in order to fully understand the clients we serve, it is essential that we
understand the contexts from which they come. As this type of material is given priority
throughout clinical training programs, student clinicians may also develop a respect for the
subjectivity of knowledge. This may lead to a beneficial breakdown in the detrimental social
hierarchy that has existed between the scientific community and those outside of it (Gergen,
1994; Gergen, 2002). As student clinicians become comfortable with the idea that all knowledge
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is situated within a specific context, they may be less inclined to assert dominant mainstream
views regarding diagnosis. This may empower the voices of the clients they serve and create
restorative discourses in which clients can feel as though they have control over the treatment
they receive, and the outcomes they can expect (Bohan, 1990).
Intersection with social justice. The concerns with our current diagnostic and
epistemological trajectory relate to issues of social justice in the sense that they may create a
detrimental hierarchy between different societal groups. Stated earlier were the notions that the
modernist scientific establishment has produced views deemed to be objective realities of what
is, with alternative views often being considered inferior (Gergen et al., 1996; Gergen et al.,
2004). The current mainstream system of diagnosis was also described as providing a deficit
model for understanding clients’ presenting problems. This may create a cultural atmosphere in
which lay people begin to see themselves as lacking, while treatment providers are seen as
necessary for helping them to overcome their shortfalls (Gergen et al., 1996).
These can also be considered issues of social justice because they give volume to the
voices of one population within society, while simultaneously silencing the voices of many
others. Language is the vehicle by which this happens. The mental health field has adopted a
pattern of “technologizing” (Gergen, 1994) terminology. This happens when terms such as
sadness, depression, and anxiety are taken in by social scientists and made into technical
concepts that are observed through experimentation and scientific inquiry. Once this happens,
these concepts are assumed to be correctly understood by the scientists who have researched
them, and only marginally understood by lay people who have not. In this way, language is used
to differentiate between members of society who are believed to be informed, and those who are

PHILOSOPHICAL ENDS

34

not. This process may result in facilitating social hierarchy and potentiating oppression (Gergen,
1994).
The social constructionist perspective might suggest that increased importance be placed
on the open dialogues shared between clients and clinicians. This may allow for a restorative
atmosphere of polyvocality, in which individuals can explore a variety of constructions through
which they can understand their difficulties. As a plethora of constructions are considered, the
range of solutions increases (Gergen, 2009). Rather than suggesting that people suffer from
illnesses like depression that involve a chemical imbalance which can only be treated through
lifelong medication use (Leventhal & Antonuccio, 2009), clients can begin to entertain the idea
that there may be a variety of effective ways to alleviate the pain they are experiencing. In this
fashion, social constructionist dialogues likely offer clients a considerable amount of hope for the
future.
As I transition from a review of past literature to an examination of the new research that
was conducted, a couple of underlying questions are asked. First, “Is a predominately modernist
theoretical orientation sufficient for bringing psychotherapeutic practice deep in the 21st
century?” and secondly, “What might modern day psychotherapy gain from adopting a wider
contextual lens toward our understanding of mental illness?” In attempting to derive some
answers to these questions, an online survey was utilized that asked participants about their
theoretical views. It compared these views with participants’ beliefs about diagnosis, depression,
and the overarching model that dominates clinical practice, the medical model.
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Method
Study Design
This study involved the use of an online survey to assess the theoretical beliefs of clinical
and counseling psychology doctoral students. It also examined the views held by clinical
psychologists who are currently practicing in the field, or who have practiced at some point
during their careers. Specifically, the administered survey sought to assess these individuals’
views regarding diagnosis, and the clinical benefits they perceive to be derived from the use of
diagnosis. It also attempted to gather information about participants’ conceptions of the
diagnosis of depression and gave particular attention to their etiological and epistemological
understandings of these kinds of illnesses. Additionally, it sought to discover participants’ views
about the diagnosis of depression as an objective or subjective construct. These views may
inform whether or not major depressive disorder is viewed as an easily measurable phenomenon,
or one that may exist outside the realm of quantification. The present study further attempted to
understand whether participants view depression as something experienced in gradations by most
people, or whether it is conceptualized as a unique experience for a minority of the population.
Participants
I recruited potential participants for the study by sending an email to graduate psychology
program directors, asking that they forward an invitation for participation to students and clinical
psychology faculty. The students were graduate students in either clinical or counseling
psychology programs who had begun seeing clients through clinical training experiences. The
faculty participants had either their PhD or PsyD, but also needed to have practiced clinically at
some point during their careers. The invitation included a link to the study survey so participants
were able to access the questionnaire as easily as possible. In hopes of increasing participation
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rates, program directors were asked to respond regarding their willingness to forward the survey
request to members of their programs. This allowed for greater awareness of the number of
potential participants.
The present study utilized a snowball sampling methodology for gathering participants.
The study survey was sent via email to doctoral-level clinical psychologists with whom I am
acquainted from my own clinical experience. As a part of this email, these psychologists were
asked to participate in the survey and forward the email to other clinical psychologists known to
them. Following this style of research methodology, the study survey made its way to a larger
number of experienced doctoral-level participants.
In addition to seeking participants from these specific groups, I also sent my survey
recruitment letter and link to psychologists and doctoral-level trainees connected to various
professional organizations, such as APA and the NCSPP (National Council of Schools and
Programs of Professional Psychology). Various college counseling centers across the country
were also contacted for recruitment and participation.
All study participants had the option to enter a drawing to win a $50 Amazon.com gift
card after successful completion of the survey. For those participants interested, an additional
and separate entry form was presented. This form asked these participants for contact
information, and automatically entered them into the drawing. As a part of this process,
confidentiality was maintained, and participants were not required to provide their names. This
separate drawing entry form was not attached to survey responses which helped to ensure that
questionnaire responses were kept confidential. This plan was designed to recruit participants
from the population being sampled.
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Measure
An online survey was utilized for data collection as a part of this study. During the
process of survey development, licensed clinical psychologists, doctoral students in the field of
clinical psychology, and clinical psychology faculty were consulted. The measure was made up
of 45 total questions from six separate question categories. Fifteen of these questions covered
participant demographic information and theoretical background. Four questions examined
participants’ views about the factors that contribute to our understanding of depression. Nine
questions addressed participants’ conceptions of the diagnosis of depression, including their
beliefs regarding its etiology and their views about its existence as an objective or subjective
phenomenon.
An additional eight questions inquired about participants’ views surrounding clinical
diagnosis. These questions specifically sought to examine their views regarding its utility, both
in terms of professional communication with those in the mental health related fields, and as a
part of therapeutic interactions with clients. Four further questions asked about people’s views in
terms of the medical model, which is the dominate model of treatment in the United States.
Finally, five questions explored participants’ professional practice, and their experience using
diagnosis. This section also briefly examined participants’ experience treating the diagnosis of
depression. The survey questions were asked through the use of Likert-type response choices
(See Appendix C for survey items).
Procedure
In order to begin the data gathering process, a request for research participation was
emailed to program directors both in clinical psychology and counseling psychology doctoral
programs. A similarly crafted email was sent to the clinical psychologists that I have come in
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contact with during my pre-doctoral practicum experiences. This same process was followed
when contacting directors of college counseling centers and psychologists associated with
professional organizations. Program directors and other psychologists willing to forward the
participation request received further information about the study, and a link to the electronic
measure. The measure was hosted by SurveyMonkey.com. Participants who opted to be involved
in the study were directed to a webpage describing and requesting their informed consent. As a
part of this page, participants learned about the goals of the present study and were informed of
any possible benefits and risks of participating. Those willing to provide their informed consent
were guided to the first page of the survey. In total, the survey should have taken approximately
15 to 20 minutes to complete. Survey responses remained anonymous and confidential
throughout the duration of data collection and analysis. Data was gathered for several weeks,
until the desired number of participants was reached. Later analysis was conducted using the
SPSS statistical analysis program.
Statistical Analysis
A working hypothesis for this study was that therapists from particular theoretical
backgrounds would have tendencies to view depression as more or less socially constructed
(Hypothesis 1a). Those who viewed depression as a more socially constructed phenomenon
would also view it as a less useful diagnosis than those therapists who view it as a more objective
biological illness (Hypothesis 1b). As depression was believed to be more closely akin to a
medical illness, it would be increasingly viewed as a vital component in understanding the
client’s symptoms. The more depression was understood as a socially constructed concept, the
less valuable the diagnosis may become as it represents one subjective view among many for
describing human experience. The null hypothesis within this proposition was that there is no

PHILOSOPHICAL ENDS

39

relationship between a person’s theoretical understanding of diagnosis and their views of it as
useful.
Analysis of variance, correlational statistics, and paired samples t-tests were utilized for
examining Hypothesis 1a and 1b. This involved assessing possible relationships between
participants’ views of depression as more social constructed, view of diagnosis as useful, and
their theoretical model of choice. Statistical crosstabulations were examined for benefit through
the large amount of data collected, while preliminarily identifying meaningful results. In this
analysis, the independent variable was a person’s theoretical model of choice. The dependent
variable was the person’s conceptualization of its usefulness, and their view of it as more socially
constructed than biological. These questions represented working Hypothesis 1.
Another working hypothesis was that clinicians who tend to view diagnosis and
depression through a more social constructionist lens would likely view the medical model as
decreasingly helpful (Hypothesis 2). To test this hypothesis, crosstabulations were used to search
through data more efficiently. Paired-samples t-tests were performed to discover the relationship
between views of diagnosis as useful, the view of depression as more socially developed, and the
view of the medical model as appropriate for psychological understanding. In these t-tests, the
independent variable was a view of depression as more socially developed. Dependent variables
were the view of diagnosis as useful, and the view of the medical model as preferable.
Through examination of interesting statistical frequencies, participants’ views were also
compared to the diathesis stress model. These types of participants may view depression as an
objective psychological illness but hold the perspective that it is approximately equal parts
biological and social (Hypothesis 3). Comparison of these frequencies provided information
about whether a diathesis-stress perspective remains a dominant context of clinical practice, or
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whether there is a significant variation in the degree to which clinicians adhere to this kind of
model.
Statistical analysis involved the comparison of views between seasoned clinicians and
clinician-in-training. This analysis offered insights into the impacts of having worked in the field
of mental health for an extended period, compared to those who are relatively new to the field.
These findings created further hypotheses about the impact of having attended graduate school in
the more distant past versus currently engaging in this kind of study. This might provide
indication of whether clinical graduate programs have begun offering students different
perspectives toward mental health treatment than they might have in the past (Hypothesis 4).
Analysis of these data involved the calculations of correlation coefficients to examine the
relationship between seasoned clinicians and social views of depression, as well as a correlation
coefficient looking at the relationship between clinicians-in-training and their views of diagnosis
as socially constructed or useful. It also included the use of one-way analysis of variance
comparisons to explore statistical significance of the data.
It was also informative to compare data frequencies between the demographic
information collected, and the individual questions asked. For example, did clinicians from
particular parts of the country tend to adhere to particular theoretical views more often than those
from other parts of the country (Hypothesis 5a)? It was further interesting to compare the
frequencies of participants from particular parts of the country and their views about the medical
model (Hypothesis 5b). In concluding analysis of the data, other demographic areas were
compared to survey questions with the hope of identifying interesting connections and
relationships.
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Each of the questions developed for the survey had the potential to highlight interesting
information about currently practicing clinicians, and their theoretical views towards diagnosis
and the treatment of depression. This information provided introductory insights into clinicians’
views towards the medical model, and how they are utilizing tools such as the DSM, or
diagnosis. Overall, this survey information supplied valuable information about the current
epistemologies guiding practitioners in the modern era. These findings told us something about
our relationship to past understandings of diagnosis and depression, while informing us of what
the future may hold for clinical practice.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Race and gender. The research sample included a total of 101 participants (N = 101)
with 82 identifying as female (82%), 18 identifying as male (18%), and one participant
identifying as gender non-binary (1%). Of these participants, 6% identified as Asian or Asian
American; 8% identified as Black/African American; 8% identified as Latino/Hispanic, or
Latinx; 81% identified as White; 6% identified as Bi-racial; and one participant identified their
race or nationality as “international” (1%). Participants could select multiple racial or ethnic
identities when completing the survey.
Age, sexual orientation, and relationship status. The mean participant age was 33
(SD= 10.9, N=100), with a maximum of 76, and a minimum of 22. Of peripheral interest, 75%
of participants identified as heterosexual, 2% as gay, 5% as lesbian, 14% as bi-sexual, 3% as
pansexual, and 1% as queer (N= 97). In reporting on their marital status, 23% of study
participants indicated that they were currently single, 38% said they were in a committed
relationship, 37% said they were married, and 2% said they were divorced (N=99).
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Educational experience, specialty track of training, and graduation. Participants were
asked about their “Highest Degree Earned at Present” (N=100). Of this data it was found that
14% had acquired their bachelors, 57% had acquired their masters, 10% had earned a PhD, and
19% had earned their PsyD. One participant in the study had also acquired their JD. Participants
were also asked about the “Highest Degree they were Anticipating.” About 20% of respondents
reported that they were anticipating their PhD to be their highest degree, while the remaining
80% felt that a PsyD would be the highest degree they earned. Six participants opted not to
answer this question. Approximately 89% indicated attending clinical psychology programs,
while 11% reported coming from counseling psychology programs.
For the purposes of conducting later comparisons, respondents were also asked whether
they had come from specialty training tracks in psychology. About 23% of respondents reported
a child specialty, 37% reported an adult specialty, 44% indicated a more generalist track, 11%
endorsed a health specialty track, 7% reported a community track, 12% reported background
training in neuropsychology, and 9% reported specialty training in forensic psychology. Some
participants also expressed other areas of specialty training including specific areas like, College
Counseling, Military, Latino/Bilingual, Couples and Families, and School Psychology.
Participants could endorse multiple areas of specialty when completing the survey.
Figure 1 displays the years that participants finished/were expecting to finish their
doctoral programs (N=98). For people who have already graduated, this included a year in the
past, while for current trainees it meant a year in the future. The majority of participants expected
to graduate between the years 2018 and 2022. These participants made up approximately 72% of
those surveyed. This also indicates that the majority of participants were likely still in training.
Of the participants that were still in their graduate programs (N=72), approximately 7%
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were in their 1st year; 15% in their 2nd year; 21% in their 3rd year; 32% in their 4th year; 18%
in their 5th year; and 7% in their 6th year. From the group of participants who had graduated in
the past (N=28), about 93% were still practicing clinically in some capacity, while the other 7%
had practiced at some point in the past.
Theoretical orientation. Figure 2 displays participants identifications in terms of
theoretical orientation. Participants could select multiple orientations to accommodate the reality
that many, if not most clinicians, consider themselves to fit somewhere within a broader
integrative category (Goodyear et al., 2016; Jaimes, Larose‐Hébert, & Moreau, 2015; Norcross
& Prochaska, 1982).
Hypothesis 1a
As a means of exploring relationships between participants’ theoretical orientations and
their views of depression as social constructed (Hypthesis 1a), related survey questions were
statistically analyzed in comparison to theoretical orientation data. For the purposes of analyzing
this data, participants who indicated an adherence to multiple orientations were grouped as
“integrative” while participants who indicated only one orientation were grouped as solely within
that orientation category. Approximately 68% of participants identified as integrative, 16% as
Cognitive-Behavioral (CBT), 11% as psychodynamic, 3% as behavioral, and 2% as humanistic
(N=100). This pattern appears largely consistent with data from other research (Goodyear et al.,
2016).
The first question examined was Question 2, “In the majority of cases, I find that the
development of depression is due to the suffering constructed between people.” Analysis of
variance showed no statistical significance between participant theoretical orientation and
participant response to question 2 F(4, 93) = .695, p = .597. Question 3 (“In the majority of cases
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I find that the development of depression is defined by individual cultures”) was also compared
to theoretical orientation, but similarly, did not show any statistical significance F(4, 93) = .874,
p = .483.
Question 12 (“my understanding of depression is significantly impacted by my cultural
upbringing”) was also analyzed against the theoretical orientation data, but no significant mean
differences were found with this comparison either F(4, 91) = 2.18, p = .077. Despite this lack of
significance, a Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis was conducted to explore this lower p-value. As a
part of this post-hoc analysis a statistically significant relationship between the psychodynamic
and humanistic orientations was found when compared to question 12 (SD = .7), p = .044. While
significant at the .05 level, this finding may represent an intriguing relationship. Problematically,
the present study did not have enough participants identifying solely as psychodynamic or
humanistic to give this lower p-value the meaning it might otherwise have.
Finally, survey Question 13 (“my understanding of depression has been significantly
shaped by my graduate school education”) was also compared with theoretical orientation, to
examine whether significant differences would be found between orientation and the
construction of clinician’s understanding of depression through graduate school. Again, no
significant differences were found F(4, 91) = 1.37, p = .250. In sum, this means that for
Hypothesis 1a, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and it must instead be concluded based on
the current data, that there may not be any statistically significant relationship between
theoretical orientation and one’s conception of depression as socially constructed.
Although no statistical significances were found between these variables, it is interesting
to note that across theoretical orientations, approximately 68% of participants agreed that
“depression is due to the suffering constructed between people” (Question 2; SD = .86, M = 3.5).
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Nearly 69% of respondents also agreed that “depression is defined by individual cultures”
(Question 3; SD = .91, M = 3.5). About 70% also agreed with the idea that “my understanding of
depression is significantly impacted by my cultural upbringing” (Question 12; SD = .93, M =
3.6). Finally, about 83% of participants believed that their understanding of depression was
shaped by their “graduate school education” (Question 13; SD= .9, M = 4).
Hypothesis 1b
A statistical crosstabulation was used to explore meaningful correlational relationships
between survey questions related to Hypothesis 1b. A significant positive correlation was found
between the belief that “… depression is defined by individual cultures” (Question 3) and
“diagnosis is useful… to create a story of client’s suffering” (Question 19), Pearson’s r(98) =
.29, p = .004. While this represents a statistically weak correlation, a significant relationship
between these variables might be considered somewhat intuitive. Survey results also revealed a
weak positive relationship between the belief that “depression is defined by individual cultures”
(Question 3) and that “diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases” (Question 15),
r(94) = .26, p = .01. This may mean that many clinicians recognize the impact of culture on the
development of depression and they also see the value of clinical diagnosis for treatment
purposes. About 69% of participants agreed and strongly agreed with the former question in this
comparison (SD = .92, M = 3.6), while approximately 81% agreed and strongly agreed with the
latter (SD = .93, M = 3.9).
A weak-to-moderate positive correlation was found between participant views to the
statements “my understanding of depression has been significantly shaped by my graduate
school education” (Question 13) and “diagnosis is useful for easing communication between
mental health professionals” (Question 14; r(94) = .40, p < .001). This finding is statistically
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significant and unlikely to be found due to chance. While correlational data do not provide a
causal explanation, this relationship may make sense if clinicians are developing a shared
understanding of depression in graduate school, and then using this for simplifying
communications in clinical practice.
A paired samples t-test was also used to explore relationships between Questions 2
(“In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering
constructed between people”) and Question 27 (“If I had the option I would prefer to assign
people diagnoses”). Responses to these questions were found to be statistically significant, with
scores to Question 2 (M = 3.57, SD = .85) being significantly higher than scores on Question 27
(M = 2.5, SD = .97), t(93) = 7.3, p < .001, d = 0.76. This data also represents a medium to large
effect size.
Question 3 was also compared to Question 27 using a paired samples t-test, and
significant differences were found in these data as well, with scores from Question 3 (M = 3.57,
SD = .90) being significantly higher than scores to Question 27 (M = 2.5, SD = .97), t(93) = 8.9,
p < .001, d = .92. This suggests that there is a meaningful relationship between participant beliefs
in depression as a culturally defined concept and their low clinical desires to assign diagnoses.
Overall, the majority of participants (69%) agreed with Question 3 and disagreed with question
27 (59%). Interestingly, while participants largely believed that depression is defined by
individual cultures (Question 3; M = 3.6, SD = .90), they also saw a benefit in using diagnoses
for developing treatment interventions (Question 16; M = 4.0, SD = .83), t(93) = -3.26, p = .002,
d = -0.38.
In sum, data from Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1b reveal that while theoretical
orientation does not seem to be a major factor influencing participant views of depression as
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socially constructed, participants across all theoretical orientations seemed to strongly endorse a
social constructionist/post-modern perspective when thinking about depression. Much of this
constructed narrative of depression seems to be acquired as trainees are in graduate school and
are learning about how members of the clinical psychology field communicate about the illness.
In assessing how this narrative is being used in clinical practice, the majority of clinicians
seemed to feel that diagnosis has a worthwhile value for conceptualization but may not be a
useful narrative to specifically assign to clients when meeting with them.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 analysis involved continuing to look at those questions relevant to
conceptualizations of depression as socially constructed, while comparing them with the survey
questions related to the medical model. A statistical crosstabulation was again used to begin
exploring collected data to determine where significant relationships between questions existed.
One unexpected finding was found in the relationship between Question 1 (M = 2.4, SD = .96;
“In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to biological illness”)
and Question 22 (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1; “Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to
medical illnesses”). Approximately 70% of participants disagreed with the idea that the
development of depression is due to biological illness, but they were overall more divided about
whether they saw it as “akin to a medical illness,” with about 45% disagreeing, 36% agreeing,
and 19% feeling uncertain. A paired t-test revealed a strong statistically significant relationship
between these questions as well, t(94) = -3.77, p < .001, d = 0.40, suggesting that the null
hypothesis can be rejected. It is unlikely that these data findings are due to chance. A different
hypothesis may instead be supported. This hypothesis is that while participants generally do not
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think depression is due to biological illness, they tend to be more comfortable thinking of it as
being related to medical illness.
A t-test also showed a relationship between Question 22 (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1; “Mental
disorders can be best understood as akin to medical illnesses”) and Question 8 (M = 2.4, SD =
1.1; “The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the experience of those who suffer from
it”), t(94) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.38. Participants predominantly disagreed with both of these
questions, and these data show that a weak-to-moderate effect size can be noticed between
variables. Of further interest was participants’ endorsement of question 11 (“I believe that
depression is a subjective experience that is difficult to measure quantitatively”) and their
previously mentioned differences in how comfortable they were with thinking about depression
as akin to medical illnesses (Question 22). About 70% of respondents agreed with Question 11
(M = 3.6, SD = .92), with significant results existing between these data also t(94) = -3.92,
p < .001, d = 0.43. This further supports the notion that participants viewed depression as a
heavily subjective experience, while still recognizing a value in likening it to different medical
experiences.
In continuing to thoroughly explore data related to Hypothesis 2, Question 24 (“In
psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an objective truth about how mental health
can be achieved”) was found to be significantly related to Question 3 (“In the majority of cases, I
find that depression is defined by individual cultures”). Approximately 66% of participants
disagreed with Question 24 (M = 2.3, SD = 1.1) while nearly 70% of respondents agreed with
Question 3 (M = 3.6, SD = .92), t(94) = -9.73, p < .001, d = 1.03. This represents a somewhat
surprising set of data as it would appear that the majority of respondents did not believe in a
clinician holding objective truth, but instead appeared to give more weight to the impact of
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culture. The effect size for these data is also quite strong, and so the relationship between these
questions may be more meaningful than previously thought. These figures gain greater interest
when responses to Question 25 (“In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist construct
a subjective reality of how mental health may be achieved”) are considered. About 91% of
respondents agreed with this question (M = 4.1, SD = .74), further emphasizing the subjective
nature of clinical work.
The ability to measure a person’s experience of depression is often connected to a
medical model of understanding, and so Question 25 (M = 4.1, SD = .74) was compared with
Question 10 (M = 2.5, SD = .97; “I believe depression is an objective illness easily measured by
quantitative scales”). Data between these questions were significant t(94) = -11.80, p < .001,
d = 1.20, with about 65% of people disagreeing with the idea that depression is easily measured
by quantitative scales.
To conclude examination of Hypothesis 2, Questions 20 (M = 2.6, SD = 1.1; “It is
important for clients to agree with the diagnoses I give them”) and Question 23 (M = 2.3, SD =
.91; “In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a doctor-patient hierarchy”) were
compared. Statistically significant results t(93) = 2.50, p = .014, d = .20 showed a small effect
size, where about 53% of people disagreed with Question 20, 29% agreed, and 18% were
uncertain. Approximately 70% of participants disagreed with Question 23, with about 15% in
agreement, and 15% feeling uncertain. These numbers indicate that participants did not tend to
see a strong value in the doctor-patient hierarchy in psychotherapeutic treatment but tend to be
more diversified in their beliefs about whether clients need to agree with assigned diagnoses.
Overall, participants did tend to strongly endorse ideas consistent with a social
constructionist mindset, however, they did not necessarily view the medical model as
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decreasingly helpful. When thinking about their work, they often disagreed with significant
components of a traditionally considered medical model, such as doctor-patient hierarchy,
biological origins to identified depressive illness, and the ability to objectively measure facets of
depressive experience. Despite the decreased belief and/or value seen amongst these factors,
participants did more often feel that comparing mental disorders to medical illnesses can be a
good way to think about them.
Hypothesis 3
Statistical crosstabulation was again used to begin sorting out survey question data that
appeared relevant and meaningful from data that were not. Hypothesis 3 is concerned with
examining trends and beliefs related to the diathesis-stress model. Survey questions inquiring
about the factors contributing to depression were explored in comparison to relevant questions
asking about specific views of depression. It should be noted that while the present study
collected information relevant to a broad understanding of the diathesis-stress model, it did not
look at discrete variables that may play mediating roles in how a person’s diathesis and stress
lead specifically to a diagnosis of depression.
Of particular interest to Hypothesis 3 was Question 1, which specifically asked about
whether participants thought depression was due to biological illness. As seen when thinking
about Hypothesis 2, the majority of participants disagreed with Question 1 (M = 2.4, SD = .96).
When analyzed with Question 4 (M = 3.6, SD = 1.03; “In the majority of cases, I find that the
development of depression is related to a person’s developmental upbringing”), the results were
found to be significant t(97) = -8.89, p < .001, d = .90. Cohen’s d shows a strong effect size and
indicates that the differences between these means may be particularly meaningful.
Approximately 68% of participants agreed with Question 4, with about 18% in disagreement.
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This data gives weight to the idea that clinicians seem to prioritize the significance of culture and
individual upbringing over one’s genetic biology when thinking about the etiology of depression.
Interestingly, Question 9 (“The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression”)
was found to be significantly related to Question 1 and Question 2 when utilizing a one-way
ANOVA for comparing Question 9 with Questions 1–4. About 51% of respondents agreed with
Question 9, with 24% in disagreement, and 25% feeling uncertain. This may show that there is a
general lack of consensus about whether societal oppression plays a role, but about half of
participants thought it did. Significance with Question 1 was found at the .05 level F(4, 91) =
2.66, p = .037, while its significance with Question 2 was at the .001 level F(4, 91) = 7.55,
p < .001. This information shows that while participants generally did not feel that biological
illness plays a primary role in the development of depression (Question 1), they were more
concerned with the roles of societal oppression (Question 9) and the suffering constructed
between people (Question 2).
Results informing Hypothesis 3 are further aided by responses to Question 10 and
Question 11, which have been previously described. With 65% of clinicians disagreeing with the
idea that depression is an “objective illness” that is “easily measured by quantitative scales” and
70% of clinicians agreeing that it is instead more “subjective,” it would appear that a significant
majority of participants might question whether specific components of a diathesis-stress
formulation could realistically be measured in an objective way that would satisfy a
modernist/naturalist epistemology.
Consistent with themes discovered within previous hypothesis data, participants strongly
prioritized the role of culture, socialization, and society over genetics and biology, when thinking
about depression. While most clinicians are likely to agree with a biopsychosocial lens, broadly
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speaking, they seem not to view one’s biology as a major factor contributing to the development
of depression. In congruence with a diathesis-stress model, they may recognize that particular
people are more likely to develop mental illness over others, based on their unique individual
make-up, but they might be more inclined to consider personal social factors that influence the
composition of one’s diathesis.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 aims to look at whether there might be significant differences between
participants who had graduated with their doctoral degree, and those who were still doctoral
program trainees. Table 2 shows the frequencies of participants who were graduated or not
graduated when broken down by their identified theoretical orientations.
Graduated and non-graduated participant data were also compared to questions from the
“Factors Contributing to Depression” portion of the survey. Analysis of variance revealed
significant variance between the means when compared to Question 3 (“In the majority of cases I
find that the development of depression is defined by individual cultures”) F(1, 96) = 4.20, p =
.043. Based on mean scores, respondents who had not yet graduated with their doctoral degrees
(M = 3.7, SD = 0.87) agreed more with Question 3 than those who had graduated (M = 3.3,
SD = 0.97). While interesting, it should be noted that the number of participants identifying as
“graduated” represented a much smaller sample size, and so this increases the likelihood of a
type 1 error when considering the null hypothesis.
Analysis of variance and correlational comparisons were also used to examine graduated
and non-graduated views related to other survey questions from “views about depression,”
“views about diagnosis,” “views about the medical model,” and “questions about professional
practice,” but no other statistically significant data were found. Based on the data collected as a
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part of this research, graduated and non-graduated clinicians were statistically consistent in their
views with the exception of Question 3.
While the present study only minimally explored the ways in which views about
depression and diagnosis may be changing over time amongst clinical psychologists, it is
interesting to consider the possibility that newer members of the field are more focused on
culture than past generations. These sorts of findings likely also speak to the impact that clinical
and counseling psychology graduate programs are having on their students. If data show that
much of a clinician’s understanding of depression is shaped by graduate school training
(Question 13), then it is logical to conclude that these programs have likely changed their
curriculum over time to reflect new ways of understanding diagnoses and mental illness. If
connected to intervention, this may also change the way these illnesses are being treated.
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 sought to explore differences in where participants completed their doctoral
programs, and the theoretical orientations that they had adopted. Table 3 provides a
crosstabulation of the frequencies of participants from various portions of the United States when
compared to their theoretical orientations. “Northwest” was not originally included on the
survey, however, it was added as a part of analysis to accommodate respondents who responded
as “other” and identified their program location more specifically. Analysis of variance was
conducted to examine the theoretical orientation variable with the program location variable,
however, no statistically significant data were found, F(4, 95) = 1.01, p = .402. It is possible that
this statistical outcome is based on some of the collected sample sizes. As the crosstabulation in
Table 3 shows, there were nearly double the number of participants who had attended programs
in the northeast when compared to the other groups. There were only three respondents
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specifically stating they had attended programs in the northwest, and there were no participants
who had attended programs in Canada. The majority of participants also fit into the “integrative”
category, with very few saying they were only utilizing one theoretical model.
In combing through other collected data for significant findings, an interesting
relationship was discovered between participants who had or were seeking PhD’s and those who
were seeking or currently had PsyD’s. Analysis of variance revealed that those participants
whose highest sought degree was a PsyD (M = 3.7, SD = 0.77) agreed more with Question 2 (“In
the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering
constructed between people”) than those whose highest degree sought was a PhD (M = 3.1, SD =
1.02), F(1, 90) = 7.44, p = .008.
In conclusion, it may be that the location of one’s graduate program does not lead to
significant changes in the theoretical orientations selected. This might suggest a strong
consistency in what constitutes a doctoral program in psychology across the country. It is also
possible that differences that do exist between programs around the country were not detected
within the survey administered. Other research focusing on different variables, or more discrete
portions of the same variables might detect subtle changes in how clinical or counseling
psychology is being taught. From the current research, there exists a possibility that clinicians
seeking or graduating with PsyD degrees may be more inclined to endorse social constructionist
views than those with PhD degrees. This could be something further explored in other research.
Limitations, Discussion, and Suggestions for Future Research
Limitations
Several important limitations should be noted when considering the data and discussion
section below. Of foundational importance to this research is the question of whether a
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quantitative form of data collection and analysis is appropriate in the context of the underlying
assumptions proposed. In fact, a very related statement was queried to participants in the survey,
“I believe that depression is an objective illness easily measured by quantitative scales.” One
might naturally assume that given the emphasis on social constructionism and relevant
principles, a qualitative inquiry would have been selected. Contrary to this intuition,
post-modernist thinking and/or constructivist lenses do not assert themselves against quantitative
inquiry, but they often recognize that the quantitative questions they propose are deeply seated in
lay and professional contexts that value the construction of narrative through numbers and
statistical analytics (Hernández, 2015).
Like the quantitative criticalist approach (Stage & Wells, 2014), the current research has
consistently proceeded with the recognition that quantitative analysis can be effectively utilized
for measuring discrepancies and inequities, can be applied for the purposes of challenging the
status quo, and can be employed for studying people and institutions within the contexts from
which they are derived (Hernández, 2015). Rather than critiquing quantitative methods as “good”
or “bad” for having developed out of a post-positivist paradigm, a constructionist approach might
instead see quantitative tools as narratives to further a broader narrative.
A second limitation of this research involved the data collected from certain subgroups of
the sampled population. The theoretical orientation groups varied in size, with small sample sizes
considering themselves to be solely humanistic or behavioral in orientation. The ability of the
present research to speak about theoretical orientation differences within the sample remained
small due to the comparatively minute representation of people from these groups. Future
research desiring to make more substantial comparisons of this type might utilize different
strategies for gathering data from psychologists who only adhere to one theoretical orientation.

PHILOSOPHICAL ENDS

56

Consideration might also be brought to the percentage of participants who had already
completed their doctorates. While not a number too small to analyze meaningfully, the majority
of the data in this study came from people in the process of finishing their degrees. It is possible
that question data became skewed based on the more prominent voice of those in training over
those who had completed their degrees. It is possible that a study conducted solely with those
holding doctorates in clinical or counseling psychology might produce different results.
Another potential limitation may be found in examining other demographic variables.
The current study sample was predominantly white and female. If it is known that culture plays a
significant role in one’s conception of mental health and/or depression, then a more diverse
sample might produce different results based on greater variation in participants’ cultural
backgrounds.
Whenever a survey is constructed, the process and procedure of its development and
analysis will likely also lead to limitations. In this study, a noteworthy limitation may be found in
the way in which participants were asked about their theoretical orientations. Participants were
asked to endorse specific theoretical orientations often thought to represent the major paradigms
guiding the field of clinical psychology. Some participants may have selected one orientation
feeling that the survey was looking for their primary orientation. There was no integrative option
in the survey administered, and the integrative category was introduced for the purposes of data
analysis. Based on this, it is possible that some of the participants only selecting one orientation,
may actually utilize multiple orientations in their work. Participants could select multiple
orientations but were not explicitly instructed to do so.
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Discussion
The current research attempted to examine relationships between therapist factors as
compared to views about diagnosis, depression, and the medical model. Hypothesis 1a was
unable to be confirmed and the current data did not support a meaningful relationship between
theoretical orientation and views about depression as being more or less socially constructed.
The current research was surprising, however, in that the majority of clinicians surveyed agreed
with a variety of clinical sentiments closely connected to a social constructionist lens. This
appeared to be across theoretical orientations, however as noted previously, there were very few
participants identifying solely with one specific orientation. Most respondents appeared to fit
more comfortably within a broad “integrative” lens.
While far from clear with the present data, these findings may represent a significant shift
among psychologists toward a post-modern understanding of diagnosis, mental health, and
clinical practice. Many clinicians may continue to identify within the theoretical orientation
categories laid down over the past hundred years, but practice within these orientations in a way
that is much more in line with a social constructionist lens than they might realize. This likely
speaks to the role of narrative in understanding everything from day-to-day functioning in our
personal lives, to the scientific realm where we develop labels and categories for simplifying
communications between professionals (Bruner, 1990).
Based on the collected data, the importance of graduate school education was also
emphasized as the majority of participants felt that their understanding of depression was shaped
by their graduate education. While unremarkably intuitive on the surface, this kind of finding
serves as a reminder that if conceptions of diagnosis and depression exist within a social/cultural
epistemology, it is imperative that these professional narratives are carefully constructed by
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those with clinical power, so that those without the same power do not experience increased
suffering (Gergen et al., 1996). Efforts of this nature would do much to assist clinical psychology
in advancing its interests in social justice.
Only a portion of Hypothesis 1b could be confirmed in the present study, and this was
connected to the finding that clinicians in this survey sample seemed to believe that depression is
largely socially constructed. In fact, the number of respondents believing depression to be
predominantly a biological illness was so small, that meaningful statistics could not be conducted
with such a sample. This finding is surprising considering the greater mental health field’s
attempt to use medical technologies for identifying mental illness at the biological level
(Calhoun & Sui, 2016; Goodkind et al., 2015; Madan et al., 2017; Maher & Maher, 1994),
however, it may be less surprising when the survey sample is considered. It may be expected that
clinical psychologists, and psychologists-in-training would have a greater focus on social and
cultural factors of mental illness, given their role and the interventions they utilize. If this
research were done with more medicalized professionals in the mental health field, the present
data might have looked significantly different.
Questions related to Hypothesis 1b further provided interesting results regarding how
clinicians tend to use diagnosis in clinical practice. As mentioned earlier in this paper,
pragmatism plays a key role in social constructionist views, and so the practical use of diagnosis
was investigated. Findings seemed to reinforce previously discussed notions of diagnosis as a
clinical tool between professionals and insurance companies, while being seen as less applicable
for clients. The majority of participants perceived diagnosis to be useful for clinical procedures
like conceptualization, easing communication between mental health professionals, and planning
interventions, although they preferred not to actually assign these diagnoses to individuals.
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While potentially beneficial in the sense that this practice might spare clients from a
detrimental label that negatively shifts their perceptions of self, another potential danger may be
created. If therapists are having conversations about client functioning that are entirely
constructed between the therapist and his/her colleagues or scientific literature, then a disconnect
has been created. This disconnect would exist between the therapist’s understanding of the
client’s mental health and subsequent healing, and the client’s understanding of their own mental
health and paths to healing. This pattern may cause the clinical work to suffer as shared
understandings are sacrificed for incongruence and epistemological differences in the therapeutic
relationship (Duncan & Miller, 2000).
While other explanatory factors may play a role in the relationships between these
variables, it would appear that the role of diagnosis may be changing in clinical practice. The
sample of individuals and their unique training backgrounds need to be considered, however,
among psychologists it would seem that diagnosis has been utilized predominantly as clinical
shorthand for simplifying clinical practices. If so, this would represent a significant change from
the use of diagnosis in generations past, where it may have been much more common for clients
to receive a specific diagnosis from a psychologist and then carry that label with them
post-session/treatment. Existent research does suggest that a gradual trend toward greater
discretion with diagnostic disclosure is being utilized by a variety of mental health provider types
(Schulze, 2007).
Hypothesis 2 findings raised interesting questions about present conceptualizations of
diagnosis and depression as well. The majority of participants did not think that depression was
primarily a biological illness, but they did think it appropriate to view it as akin to medical
illnesses. One can only wonder about exactly why this might be, but several interesting
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possibilities may arise. One idea may take us back to the influence of narrative on clinical
thinking. It is possible that their perceived value in likening depression to medical illnesses may
come from the ability to communicate broadly about mental illnesses, with populations that are
less familiar with the complexities of the diagnostic narrative. Clinicians who do choose to
disclose client diagnoses may have an easier time saying that depression is similar to “breaking
your arm,” rather than having to explain the complicated constructive process that has led to the
diagnosis of depression, or the fact that mental illnesses exist in a much more subjective realm
than medical illnesses that allow for greater objective scrutiny.
It may also be hypothesized that viewing depression or mental illness as “akin to medical
illnesses” provides the long-term connection psychology has desired with the medical field, or
even the natural science fields before that (Hatfield, 2002; Laungani, 2004). As clinical
psychology and mental health practices have found their way into the “Health Sciences” family,
it helps to look and sound similar to our health science siblings, so that people do not begin to
question the relationship. Significant questioning of this sort would impact the funding available
for mental health resources, and it might complicate the ways in which a lay public receiving
mental health treatment would view or respect the work being done (Laungani, 2004).
Findings further elucidate current conceptions of the DSM-5. It would appear that while
clinicians broadly see value in the use of diagnosis for specific clinical purposes, they do not see
the DSM-5 diagnosis of depression as wholly descriptive of depressed clients’ experiences. In
many ways this may be connected to previously discussed findings, where clinicians saw the
diagnosis of depression as part of a deeper cultural construct, where socialization and
relationships are believed to play significant roles. If culture, relationships, and social
experiences provide the most fertile ground for the development of depressive experiences, then

PHILOSOPHICAL ENDS

61

it would seem unlikely that a single universally applied diagnosis could represent these people
well.
This may also be a circumstance where similar research with our medical colleagues
might produce different results. If the current research were done with psychiatrists, primary care
physicians, or nurses for example, one might expect to see significantly different endorsements
of the surveyed questions. In a specifically medicalized environment where diagnosis is even
more likely to dictate a course of treatment, it might not be surprising to find mental health
diagnoses being thought of as proportionally more similar to medical diagnoses.
Findings related to Hypotheses 2 and 3 also inform discussion of how measurable
depression is believed to be. Within medical or diathesis stress models, there is added emphasis
on one’s ability to measure experiences like depression. According to the current research,
participants largely felt that depression could not be easily measured by quantitative scales.
Again, one must be careful about generalizations significantly beyond the parsimonious
information provided in the data, but based on the current findings, it is reasonable to wonder
what the collected data might mean. It may be that clinicians are using the variety of objective or
semi-objective measures that exist for measuring depression but hold a deeper belief that those
measures can provide only a portion of the overall picture. It could also mean that clinicians are
utilizing such measures of client depression for other reasons altogether, as directed by
professional organizations or companies. This would likely create some diversity in clinical
settings where such measures are used, potentially influencing narratives of how clients’
depression is understood. Other possibilities also exist but will be left for exploration in other
research and other papers.
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Early suppositions of this research regarding the subjective nature of psychotherapy also
appeared to be confirmed in the current research, with about two thirds of participants denying
the idea that clinicians hold an objective truth about how to achieve mental health. Pair this with
the surprising 91% of people who believed in the subjective construction of realities taking place
in psychotherapy, and a strong post-modern picture begins to emerge. Among members of the
clinical psychology field, this kind of finding may make sense, however, it is sharply contrasted
with lay cultural beliefs supposing that mental health providers will have a clear formula for how
to achieve mental before meeting with a client (Furnham, Pereira, & Rawles, 2001; Furnham &
Wardley, 1990).
The Hypothesis 5 finding indicating potential differences between PsyD and PhD
participants may also feed into this discussion. As stated before, other variables may be at work,
and generalizations should be taken lightly given their departure from specifically what the data
suggest. With this in mind, one might wonder whether the emphasis on clinical work within
PsyD programs is more likely to lead to a constructionist viewpoint than the more
research-oriented PhD programs. Might there be greater respect for a modernist scientific
approach if one is asked to focus more time and energy on conducting research in this way? The
current research provided only the beginnings of an inquiry into potential differences, but they
would be interesting to explore further in other studies.
Continuing discussion of the therapeutic relationship in psychotherapy, clinicians tended
not think a doctor-patient hierarchy was necessary but were mixed in the extent to which they
felt that clients should agree with diagnoses they provide. At the outset, hypotheses about this
finding could appear contradictory. For instance, the question may arise, “How can the
doctor-patient hierarchy not matter, but then a client’s acceptance of a clinician provided
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diagnosis does matter?” These two ideas might seem incompatible when given the recognition
that providing a diagnosis for a client supports an implicit hierarchy. Alternatively, clinicians
valuing diagnostic agreement between therapist and client might be viewing this as greater
opportunity for alignment in the therapeutic relationship, with some (hopefully) concurrent
discussion of what the diagnosis means and whether it seems accurate to the client’s experience.
The presented research also inquired about participants’ views related to societal
oppression and the development of depression. Approximately one out of every two participants
believed that the etiology of depression is significantly impacted by the oppression that exists in
society. This finding may not seem surprising to many within the mental health community, who
often have a heightened focus on the role of oppression in the development of mental illness
(Barker, 2015; Hunn & Craig, 2009; Neitzke, 2016).
This kind of finding does depart in some ways from the longstanding medical model that
has guided mental health treatment over the last hundred years. In many ways, the present
research harkens back to early questions of “nature” and “nurture” and arguments about which
factor matters more in development, mental health, or other psychologically related questions.
Many early psychologists, psychiatrists, researchers, medical doctors and the like almost
certainly had an awareness of how both are implicated in mental health issues, however, the
avenue by which they conceptualized problems and proscribed treatment have unquestionably
changed. The current research identified a portion of this change as seen in connection to
Hypothesis 4. Doctoral students in clinical and counseling psychology believed that culture plays
a role in the development of depression to a greater extent than their already graduated seniors.
If a significant portion of the etiology of depression is now viewed as seated within a
broader cultural lens, with recognition of oppression as a precipitant for this suffering, then
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future psychotherapeutic treatment may begin to look a lot different than it has in past. It may
spend less time attempting to uncover secrets hidden away deep in the psyche or in chemical
mechanisms of action, while spending more time exploring cultural beliefs, values, injustices,
and subjugations that have led a person to feel disconnected from a meaningful group in their
life. A broad application of many different therapeutic narratives will likely continue to be used,
but we may at least have a glimpse of the future of mental health treatment as we witness these
sorts of changes.
The bottom line, at least from a social constructionist lens, is not that one view or
perspective is better than the other, but that changes in perspective have pragmatic impacts on
the way things are done (Gergen, 1994; Gergen et al., 1996). Treatment efficacy hinges on these
pragmatic impacts and the outcomes that are produced by the mental health work being done. It
is also very pragmatic to recognize that creating change within an individual is generally going
to be a great deal easier than creating changes in a society. In this light the mental health
professional must consider, “What are positive changes I can help this individual make within
himself or herself, despite knowing that the culture from which they come is at least partially
responsible for their suffering?” This kind of question does not adopt a deficit model, suggesting
that the individual is “disordered,” but holds onto the idea that individuals can be empowered,
strengthened, and taught skills to cope with a world often experienced as unfair. This may build
autonomy and individuality in ways that support greater mental health and well-being (Finfgeld,
2004).
Suggestions for Future Research
Future research might consider the further exploration of factors related to theoretical
orientation and the ways psychotherapy is delivered. In connection to the research presented in
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this paper, it might examine the ways in which diagnostic practices differ between clinicians
based on their orientations. Understanding these facets of clinical psychology practice might
provide meaningful insights into how treatment differs between providers, and the role that
diagnosis plays, if any.
Future research might also pose similar questions to mental health practitioners in
psychiatry, primary care, and social work disciplines. If the field of clinical psychology is to
continue moving in a direction similar to medical practice, then it would be important to
understand similarities and differences between how professionals are thinking about diagnoses.
This would likely ease collaborative care between these providers and create greater coherence
in the narratives provided to patients/clients. Based on the current research, it may be
hypothesized that psychiatrists would be more inclined to view depression through a biological
lens than psychologists.
Another area for continuing research involves the use of diathesis-stress, and its
relationship to epigenetics. As previously stated, the diathesis-stress model attempts to include
both biological and social/environmental factors that contribute to the development of mental
illness. Research in epigenetics enlightens us to the idea that social/environmental variables can
change a person’s DNA, leading to changes in gene expression and subsequent hereditary
endowment (Barker, 2018). This kind of research might further highlight the ways in which a
person’s diathesis is shaped by social/cultural factors, and how these factors influence not only a
person’s reaction to stress in the present, but how also their individual response is shaped by
different environmental factors from their ancestors’ past.
New research might seek to further understand the ways in which diagnostic practices are
being used in the therapy room with clients, and within clinical settings. This research might
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create new understanding for treatment delivery and the role that diagnosis plays. For instance, if
clinicians are primarily using diagnosis to communicate among themselves and to insurance
companies, it may be helpful to reformat how they are designed so that their practical use may be
consistent. It may also be helpful for research to examine some of these roles further, so that new
ways of communicating with insurance companies are constructed, so that clients are not forced
into a diagnostic category for the purposes of having their treatment covered.
Finally, the field of clinical psychology might be aided by new studies exploring the
benefits of post-modern psychotherapy. The current research would seem to suggest that the
majority of clinicians hold beliefs consistent with a post-modern view; however, it is clear that
many other areas of the field remain firmly entrenched in modernist domains. While it is possible
that modern and post-modern practice can operate together, knowledge and awareness of how
this is being down would seem paramount. This might allow for the benefits of each perspective
to be reinforced and supported, while the weaknesses are mindfully avoided.
In order to construct the most effective research, the most beneficial treatments, and the
most egalitarian relationships, it is necessary to examine not only where the field currently is, but
where it has been. The further we move chronologically from our roots, the more likely we are to
forget their importance. A strong clinical psychology profession will require all of the
meaningful narratives from the past to build the most meaningful mental health reality for
tomorrow.
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Appendix A
Recruitment Letter

Hello, my name is Chris Johnson and I’m interested in collecting survey data from
doctoral-level clinicians who are currently practicing, or who have practiced clinically at some
point in their careers. I am also interested in collecting data from current doctoral-level students
in either clinical or counseling psychology programs, who have begun treating clients as a part of
a practicum, internship, or other training experience. This brief survey is a part of my doctoral
dissertation research at Antioch University New England.
This survey is anonymous and will require you to answer questions about your theoretical
orientation and views surrounding the etiology of depression. It will also include questions about
your views related to clinical diagnosis and the medical model of treatment. The survey will
conclude by asking questions about your use of diagnoses in clinical practice. As a way of
thanking you for your time, you will have the opportunity to enter a drawing for a $50
Amazon.com gift card. Please click the link below to continue to further information about the
study, the informed consent form, and/or to begin participating.

https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/WTVT9NR

Thank you! I greatly appreciate your consideration.
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Appendix B
Informed Consent
Dear Prospective Participant,
This survey attempts to gather information from psychologists who are currently in clinical
practice, and those who have practiced at some point during their careers. It also seeks
information from psychologists-in-training. It seeks to examine your views regarding the use of
diagnosis and will ask you about your specific perceptions regarding the diagnosis of depression.
This survey is also interested in your thoughts on the medical model and will include questions
to that effect.

Your responses will assist in providing information about the use of diagnostic conceptualization
in the 21st century, while adding knowledge to the existing scholarly literature on how various
theoretical models influence clinical practice.

There are minimal, if any, risks from participating. Your identity will be completely anonymous
and confidential. You will not be asked for your name, and all demographic information
collected will be reported as aggregated information. No personally identifiable information will
be associated with your responses to any reports of these data. This survey will take
approximately 30 minutes to complete.

This survey is part of my dissertation research at Antioch University New England in the Psy.D.
in Clinical Psychology program. The study results may be included in future presentations and
publications.
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At the end of the survey you will have the opportunity to enter a drawing to win a $50 Amazon
gift card. To enter, you need only submit an email address to be contacted at should your
entrance be drawn. Email addresses will be kept entirely separate from survey data and cannot be
used to connect individuals to their survey responses.

Your participation is voluntary, and you may decide to discontinue the survey at any time. If you
do fill out the survey, you may leave any questions blank, but I ask that you answer as many
questions as you can. If you should have any questions about the survey, please email me at
(redacted).

This project has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Antioch University New
England. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact Dr.
Kevin Lyness at 603-283-2149. You may also contact AUNE interim provost, Dr. Barbara
Andrews by email at bandrews@antioch.edu or by phone at 603-283-2436.

I have read and understood the above information. By clicking “Next” below, I am indicating
that I have read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this research study.

Please print a copy of this page for your records.
Thank you for your participation!
Chris Johnson, M.S.
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Appendix C
Survey
Do you agree to participate?
Yes
No
Demographic and Program Information
Gender?
_____ Male _____ Female _____ Transgender
_____ Other (please specify): ________________
Race/ethnicity? (select all that apply)
_____ American Indian/Alaska Native
_____ Asian/ Asian American
_____ Black or African American
_____ Latino/Hispanic/Latinx

_____ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
_____ White
_____ Biracial
_____ Other (please specify):
_________________

Age? _____
Sexual Orientation? _____ Heterosexual
_____ Gay
_____ Bisexual
_____ Asexual

_____ Lesbian _____ Pansexual
Other: _______________

Marital Status? _____ Single _____ In a committed relationship _____ Married
_____ Divorced
_____ Widowed
Highest degree earned at present: _____ Bachelor’s
_____ Master’s
_____ PhD
_____ PsyD
_____ Other (please specify): _______________
Highest degree anticipated: _____ Bachelor’s
_____ Master’s
_____ PhD
_____ PsyD
_____ Other (please specify): _______________
Type of Graduate Program Attended: _____ Clinical

_____ Counseling

Training Track of Specialty (select multiple if needed): _____ Child
_____ Adult
_____ General
_____ Health
_____ Community
_____ Neuropsychology
_____ Other (please specify): _______________
Have you already graduated with your doctoral degree? Yes_____ No______
If No:
Current Year of Study in Graduate Program: _____ 1st
_____ 2nd
_____ 3rd
_____ 4th
_____ 5th
_____ 6th
_____ 7th
_____ 8th or later
If Yes:
Are you a clinician currently in clinical practice, or a clinician who has practiced in the past?
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Practiced in the Past___________

Year of graduation from program (or anticipated year): _____
Where is/was your program located?: _____ USA (Midwest)
_____ USA (Northeast)
_____ USA (South) _____ USA (West) _____ Canada
How would you primarily describe your views from a theoretical stand point?
Psychodynamic _______
Humanistic ______

Existential _______

Behavioral________

Cognitive-behavioral _______
Constructivist ________

Interpersonal ___________

Other ______________________

Views about Factors Contributing to Depression
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below
discussing the factors contributing to the diagnosis of depression.
1. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to biological
illness.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree____

2. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is due to the suffering
constructed between people.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree____

3. In the majority of cases, I find that depression is defined by individual cultures.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree____

4. In the majority of cases, I find that the development of depression is related to a person’s
developmental upbringing.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree____
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Views about Depression
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
regarding the diagnosis of depression.
5. Depression is a universal phenomenon, presenting itself similarly in people around the
world.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree____

6. Depression is made up of symptoms that everyone experiences at some point during
their lifetime.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

7. Depression is made up of symptoms that only a certain percentage of the population will
experience during their lifetime.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

8. The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the experience of those who suffer
from it.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

9. The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

10. I believe depression is an objective illness easily measured by quantitative scales.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

11. I believe depression is a subjective experience that is difficult to measure quantitatively.
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

12. My understanding of depression is significantly impacted by my cultural upbringing.
Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

13. My understanding of depression has been significantly shaped by my graduate school
education.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

Views about Diagnosis

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements
regarding diagnosis.
14. Diagnosis is useful for easing communication between mental health professionals.
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Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

15. Diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

16. Diagnosis is useful for developing treatment interventions.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

17. Diagnosis is useful for completing billing procedures with insurance companies.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

18. Diagnosis is useful for providing clients with a language for understanding their
suffering.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

19. Diagnosis is useful for helping clients to create a story of their suffering.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

20. It is important for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give them.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

21. It is unimportant for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give them.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

Views about the Medical Model

Please answer the following questions regarding your views on the medical model of
understanding psychological illness and using diagnosis.
22. Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to medical illnesses.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

23. In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a doctor-patient hierarchy.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

24. In psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an objective truth about how
mental health can be achieved.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

25. In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist construct a subjective reality of
how mental health may be achieved.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____
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Questions about Professional Practice
Please answer the following questions regarding your professional experience of using
diagnosis.
26. I discuss the diagnoses I give with the client’s I give them to.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

27. If I had the option I would prefer to assign people diagnoses.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

28. In my clinical work I have found diagnosis to be useful.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

29. Most clients have their own understanding of their depression that doesn’t match the
DSM-5 criteria.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree_____

30. Most clients have an understanding of their depression that matches the DSM-5 criteria
well.

Strongly Disagree___ Disagree_____ Uncertain____ Agree____ Strongly Agree___
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Table 1
Survey Questions
Topics

Questions

Factors Contributing to
Development of
Depression

Q1.
Q2.

Q3.
Q4.

Conceptions of
Depression

Q5.
Q6.
Q7.

Q8.
Q9.
Q10.
Q11.
Q12.
Q13.
Views of Diagnosis

Q14.
Q15.
Q16.
Q17.
Q18.

In the majority of cases, I find that the development of
depression is due to biological illness.
In the majority of cases, I find that the development of
depression is due to the suffering constructed between
people.
In the majority of cases, I find that depression is defined by
individual cultures.
In the majority of cases, I find that the development of
depression is related to a person’s developmental
upbringing.

Depression is a universal phenomenon, presenting itself
similarly in people around the world.
Depression is made up of symptoms that everyone
experiences at some point during their lifetime.
Depression is made up of symptoms that only a certain
percentage of the population will experience during their
lifetime.
The DSM-5 diagnosis of depression fully captures the
experience of those who suffer from it.
The presence of depression is a result of societal oppression.
I believe that depression is an objective illness easily
measured by quantitative scales.
I believe that depression is a subjective experience that is
difficult to measure quantitatively.
My understanding of depression is significantly impacted by
my cultural upbringing.
My understanding of depression has been significantly shaped
by my graduate school education.

Diagnosis is useful for easing communication between mental
health professionals.
Diagnosis is useful for conceptualizing client cases.
Diagnosis is useful for developing treatment interventions.
Diagnosis is useful for completing billing procedures with
insurance companies.
Diagnosis is useful for providing clients with a language for
understanding their suffering.
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Q19. Diagnosis is useful for helping clients to create a story of
their suffering.
Q20. It is important for clients to agree with the diagnosis I give
them.
Q21. It is unimportant for clients to agree with the diagnosis I
give them.

Q22. Mental disorders can be best understood as akin to medical
illnesses.
Q23. In psychotherapeutic practice, it is necessary to have a
doctor patient hierarchy.
Q24. In psychotherapeutic practice, the clinician understands an
objective truth about how mental health can be achieved.
Q25. In psychotherapeutic practice, the client and therapist
construct a subjective reality of how mental health may be
achieved.
Q26. I discuss the diagnoses I give with the clients I give them
to.
Q27. If I had the option I would prefer to assign people
diagnoses.
Q28. In my clinical work I have found diagnosis to be useful.
Q29. Most clients have their own understanding of their
depression that doesn’t match the DSM-5 criteria.
Q30. Most clients have an understanding of their depression
that matches the DSM-5 criteria well.
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Table 2
Theoretical Orientation Comparison with Current Graduation Status
Theoretical Orientation
Psychodynamic Humanistic Behavioral

CBT

Integrative

Total

Have you already

Yes

3

0

0

2

23

28

graduated with

No

8

2

3

14

45

72

11

2

3

16

68

100

your doctoral
degree?
Total
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Table 3
Program Location Comparison with Theoretical Orientation

Theoretical Orientation
Where is/was USA (Midwest)

Psychodynamic
1

Humanistic
1

your program USA (Northeast)

8

1

0

USA (South)

0

0

USA (West)

2

USA

located?

Behavioral CBT
1
6

Integrative
8

Total
17

2

29

40

0

4

16

20

0

2

3

13

20

0

0

0

1

2

3

11

2

3

16

68

100

(Northwest)
Total
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
How would you describe your views from a theoretical standpoint? (Check
all that apply)
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